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CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE BY SEC
REGISTRANTS: REVISITING THE SEC’S 2010
INTERPRETIVE RELEASE
Rick E. Hansen*
INTRODUCTION
During an open meeting on January 27, 2010, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) approved an interpretive release (the
Interpretive Release) providing guidance to companies, or “registrants,” that
are subject to federal securities laws regarding their disclosure obligations
in connection with the risks and opportunities of climate change.1 Approved
by a three-to-two vote of the SEC Commissioners, the Interpretive Release
came nearly three years after a coalition of large institutional investors
submitted a petition to the SEC seeking such guidance.2 That the SEC
waited nearly three years to address the petitioners’ request and did so by a
split vote (along perceived party lines) was an indication of the contentious
nature of the topics addressed in the Interpretive Release and the SEC’s role
in the ongoing climate change debate. While the SEC’s Interpretive Release
was careful to emphasize that the SEC was not imposing new disclosure
requirements or taking a position on whether climate change has been
occurring, it did indicate that the direct and indirect effects of climate
change on a registrant’s business may in fact be material to that registrant’s
investors and, therefore, require disclosure in the registrant’s SEC filings.3
Prior to the 2010 Interpretive Release, it had been almost thirty years
since the SEC first issued interpretive guidance on environmental disclosure
in registrants’ SEC filings.4 In 1971, the SEC issued an interpretive release
stating that registrants should consider disclosing in their SEC filings the
financial impact of compliance with environmental laws, based on the
materiality of that information.5 Since that time, the federal government,

*
Senior Counsel, Corporate Governance, Chevron Corporation. Juris Doctor, summa cum
laude, Seattle University School of Law (2000). Master of Laws, Securities and Financial
Regulation, with distinction, Georgetown University Law Center (2012).
1. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange
Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Interpretive
Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp.shtml.
2. See Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 4-547, 2 (Sept. 18,
2007) [hereinafter Petition], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf.
John M. Broder, S.E.C. Adds Risk Related Climate to Disclosure List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010,
at B1.
3. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,290–91.
4. Id. at 6,292.
5. See Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights,
Exchange Act Release No. 5170, 1971 WL 127132 (July 19, 1971). The considerations set forth in
this release were codified in 1973. See Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Registration and
Report Forms to Require Disclosure with Respect to Compliance with Environmental
Requirements and Other Matters, Exchange Act Release No. 5386, 1973 WL 149331 (Apr. 20,
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many U.S. states, and the international community have taken a number of
measures designed to address the perceived and increasingly recognized
effects of climate change. International efforts have included, among others,
the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accords, and the European Union
Emissions Trading System.6 Here in the United States, state and local
governments have individually, or in concert with others, enacted various
measures to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases. Such emissions are
widely understood to be among the chief causes of climate change.
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) is perhaps the
most recognized, but certainly not the only example.7 Coalition efforts
include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, comprised of states in the
Northeast and East; the Western Climate Initiative, comprised of several
Western states and Canadian provinces; and the Midwestern Greenhouse
Gas Reduction Accord, comprised of several U.S. states and Canadian
provinces.8 In December 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) issued an “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding” for
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, allowing the EPA to craft rules
targeted at greenhouse gas emission regulation.9 The EPA began requiring
large emitters of greenhouse gases to collect and report data with respect to
their greenhouse gas emissions.10 While the federal government has yet to
adopt comprehensive climate change legislation, it may well be only a
matter of time before the political stars are realigned sufficiently allowing
such legislation to be put in place.11
For many companies, including SEC registrants—the focus of this
Article—these legislative and regulatory developments could have, as the
1973). They were later incorporated into Regulation S-K. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure
System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 1982 WL 90370 (Mar. 3, 1982).
6. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,290, 6,296.
7. See Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500–38599, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
AB 32’s primary purposes are: (1) to establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions cap at 1990
levels by the year 2020; and (2) to require the development of mandatory emissions reporting
rules to facilitate the management of emissions reduction programs. A ballot initiative in 2010 to
suspend AB 32 was defeated at the polls by a wide margin.
8. Other U.S. states have been actively engaged in climate change regulation as well. For a
detailed list of regional U.S. local, state and regional actions on climate change, see U.S. States
and Regions, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/statesregions (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
9. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch.
1). The EPA’s authority to enact such rules was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Mass.
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s refusal to treat greenhouse gases as pollutants and
declaring that they are in fact air pollutants under the Clean Air Act).
10. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.).
11. For a list of bills introduced in the current Congressional session, see U.S. Climate and
Clean Energy Policy, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org
/federal (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
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SEC has opined, “a significant effect on operating and financial
decisions.”12 Local, state, federal, and international regulation of
greenhouse gases may require registrants to increase capital expenditures to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions or incur additional expenses to adhere to
cap-and-trade schemes such as, among others, the expense of purchasing
additional allowances when reduction targets cannot be met.13 Registrants
that may not be directly affected by such developments “could nonetheless
be indirectly affected by changing prices for goods or services provided by
companies that are directly affected and that seek to reflect some or all of
their changes in costs of goods in the prices they charge.”14
The potential risks (and opportunities, as the SEC points out) of climate
change are not limited to the direct and indirect costs of compliance with
climate change legislation and regulation. If the science of climate change is
to be believed, and for the purpose of this Article I assume that it is, the
physical effects of climate change also pose additional and unique risks for
registrants. In its most recent assessment of global climate change, the oftcited Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has observed that
“warming of the [Earth’s] climate system is unequivocal” and that “natural
systems are being affected by regional climate changes, particularly
temperature increases.”15 According to the IPCC, most of the observed
increases in global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (i.e.,
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide) and global average
temperatures are “very likely” due to human activity, and without changes
in climate change mitigation policies, “global [greenhouse gas emissions]
will continue to grow over the next few decades.”16 In its Fourth
12.
13.
14.
15.

Interpretative Release, supra note 1, at 6,291.
Id.
Id.
LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30–31 (2007)
[hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4
/syr/en/spm.html. The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization
and United Nations Environment Programme. Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited June
21, 2012).
The IPCC is a scientific body. It reviews and assesses the most recent scientific,
technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the
understanding of climate change. . . .
....
The IPCC is an intergovernmental body. It is open to all member countries of the
United Nations (UN) and WMO. Currently 195 countries are members of the IPCC.
Governments participate in the review process and the plenary Sessions, where main
decisions about the IPCC work programme are taken and reports are accepted, adopted
and approved. . . .
Organization, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited Apr. 5,
2012).
16. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 15, at 44.
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Assessment Report, the IPCC observed that the twelve warmest years
globally since 1850—when such records were first kept—was the period
1995–2006.17 Effects warming has had on the Earth’s climate systems, as
catalogued by the IPCC, include: melting glaciers and polar ice sheets,
rising sea levels and ocean salinity, changes in regional precipitation
amounts and wind patterns, and higher incidences of extreme weather—
particularly heat waves, droughts, and tropical cyclones.18 It is argued that
these changes could, among other things, impact a registrant’s operating
costs, physical assets, distribution channels, supply chains, water supplies,
financial well-being, creditworthiness, demand chains, and, importantly,
investment opportunities.19
Investors’ awareness of the alleged threats climate change may present
to the companies they invest in has strengthened considerably in recent
years. This is manifest by many of the phenomena discussed in this Article,
whether through petitions to regulatory bodies, disclosure studies, position
papers, or shareholder proposals. These investors argue, not without some
plausible basis, that the effects of climate change and the transition to a
carbon constrained or low carbon economy will affect companies’ market
values and ability to compete.20 Not coincidentally, many companies have
begun to recognize the implications of climate change and its regulation for
their long-term success. Describing this intersection of investor and
company awareness of the importance of climate change as a “tipping
point,” a 2009 study of 800 global companies by Goldman Sachs showed
that “60% of those companies have established board or senior management
responsibility for climate change performance.”21
A particular challenge for registrants is determining what they should
be saying in their SEC filings about the effects of climate change on their
businesses. Determining how and when climate change will have a material
impact on a company and its businesses is no easy task. To make such
determinations, registrants must be adept at understanding, and resolving
competing interpretations of, the science of climate change. They must
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Jim Coburn et al., Disclosing Climate Risks & Opportunities in SEC Filings: A
Guide for Corporate Executives, Attorneys & Directors, CERES, INC., 11 (2011), available at
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/disclosing-climate-risks-2011; John P. Holdren, Teresa &
John Heinz Professor of Envtl. Policy & Professor of Earth & Planetary Sciences, Harvard Univ.,
Director, The Woods Hole Research Ctr., Chair of the Board, AAS, Presentation at Investor
Summit on Climate Risk: Global Climatic Disruption–Risks and Opportunities (Feb. 14, 2008),
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18700/global_climatic_disruption
.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F140%2Fjohn_p_holdren.
20. Petition, supra note 2, at 5–10.
21. ANDREW HOWARD ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, CHANGE IS COMING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE—A DEFINING ISSUE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2009), available at http://www
.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/environment-and-energy/change-is-coming-a-framework-for
-climate-change.pdf.
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analyze the potential effects of federal, state, and even international climate
regulatory initiatives, understand the direct and indirect effects of
legislation, and craft where necessary meaningful disclosure that is
responsive to SEC requirements without being so speculative in nature as to
be uninformative or, even worse, misleading.
In recognition of these developments, as well as in response to petitions
for interpretive guidance, the SEC approved the Interpretive Release that is
the subject of this Article. I contend that, since the issuance of the
Interpretive Release, registrant disclosures concerning climate change in the
registrant’s SEC filings have matured and increased (a term I use with some
reservation because it ignores considerations of materiality), though perhaps
modestly, and that for the reasons discussed in Part VII of this Article, we
can expect to see these disclosures continue to mature and increase over
time. Part I discusses the SEC’s rules that explicitly or implicitly require
climate change disclosure, all of which were “on the books” long before the
Interpretive Release. Part II highlights the concept of materiality in
disclosure to inform discussion of a registrant’s climate change related
disclosure obligations. Part III examines some of the extant surveys of
registrant climate change disclosure prior to the issuance of the Interpretive
Release. Part IV reviews the petition for interpretive guidance and the
Interpretive Release. Part V provides a survey of registrant climate change
disclosure, focusing on post-Interpretive Release disclosures to offer insight
into whether the Interpretive Release prompted changes in registrant
disclosures. In Part VI, reasons for the assumed lack of registrant climate
change disclosure are considered. Finally, in Part VII, I discuss possible
trends that I believe will contribute to a maturation or increase in registrant
climate change disclosure.
I. SEC RULES REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE ISSUES
The disclosure requirements addressed by the Interpretive Release are
the product of decades of SEC development. As early as 1968, the SEC
began developing requirements for registrants to discuss and analyze their
financial condition and results of operations in their annual and periodic
SEC filings.22 In 1971, the SEC issued an interpretive release stating that
registrants should consider disclosing, in their periodic and annual reports,
the material effects of compliance with environmental laws on the
registrant’s finances.23 By 1982, following a number of public hearings and
rulemaking efforts, much of the SEC’s current disclosure requirements

22. See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 6835, 1989 WL
1092885 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 6835].
23. See Petition, supra note2.
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were in place.24 Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court was refining the
concept of “materiality” that pervades many of these disclosure
requirements.25
In the context of climate change, the SEC’s most relevant disclosure
rules are found in Regulation S-K.26 These are: Item 101—Description of
Business; Item 103—Legal Proceedings; Item 303—Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation;
and Item 503(c)—Risk Factors.27 Regulation S-X,28 particularly Article 3—
General Instructions as to Financial Statements, also contains some relevant
requirements.29 Not to be overlooked is Rule 408 under the Securities Act
of 1933 (the Securities Act)30 and Rule 12b-20 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act),31 which require, in addition to
the information expressly required by the rules mentioned above, “such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
[were] made not misleading.”32
A company (i.e., registrant) may become subject to these disclosure
requirements on a one-time basis by filing a registration statement relating
to the offering of securities pursuant to the requirements of the Securities
Act.33 Likewise, a registrant may become subject to these disclosure
requirements on an ongoing and continual basis by coming within the
purview of the registration requirements of the Exchange Act.34 Section 13
of the Exchange Act requires registrants to file with the SEC, and thereby
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,292.
See infra Part II.
17 C.F.R. § 229 (2011).
Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,293–95.
17 C.F.R. § 210.
See Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,293.
17 C.F.R. § 230.408.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20.
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that all securities offered or sold in the
United States by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer in interstate commerce or through the use of the
mails must be registered with the SEC, unless an exemption applies. The purpose of this
requirement is to provide potential investors with full and fair disclosure and certain legal
remedies if the disclosure does not meet the statutory and regulatory standards. To register, an
offeror of securities files a registration statement with the SEC. The forms of registration
prescribed under this Act generally include requirements for the disclosures called for by
Regulation S-K, Items 101, 103, 303, and 503(c), and Regulation S-X. For example, Part I, Item
11 (Information With Respect to the Registrant) of a Registration Statement on Form S-1 requires
the registrant to include in the registration statement the information detailed by these items. 15
U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
34. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006). The following are
subject to the Exchange Act: (a) any issuer of securities traded on a national securities exchange
(§ 12(a)); (b) any issuer with a class of equity securities held by 500 shareholders of record and
having more than $10 million in total assets (§ 12(g)(1)); and (c) any issuer not meeting either (a)
or (b) but having filed a registration statement subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and having
more than 300 shareholders of record. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o.
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make available to the public, quarterly and annual reports.35 Thus, each time
a registrant files an annual report on Form 10-K or a quarterly report on
Form 10-Q, it does so in compliance with the provisions of § 13 of the
Exchange Act. Nonetheless, these reports serve more than just a compliance
function; they provide a key source of information to investors and the
public.36 The SEC has prescribed disclosures that should appear in those
quarterly and annual reports in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X
discussed below.37 This Article focuses principally on the disclosures
required of Exchange Act registrants in their annual reports on Form 10-K.
Item 101 of Regulation S-K—Description of Business—requires a
registrant to describe the development of its business during the past five
years.38 To do so, the registrant must discuss, among other things, its form
of organization, its past business and business it intends to do, and the
dominant segments of its business (including its principal products
produced and services rendered, major customers, its dependence, if any,
upon a single customer, and the existence of competitive conditions). In
addition, a registrant is required to discuss its research and development
initiatives and working capital practices.39 More specifically, Item 101
requires “appropriate disclosure” as to the “material effects that compliance
with Federal, State and local” environmental laws “may have upon the
[registrant’s] capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.”40
Item 101 also requires disclosure of “any material estimated capital
expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of [the
registrant’s] current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such
further periods as the registrant may deem material.”41 Thus, in the context
of climate change, Item 101 may potentially require disclosure and
discussion of, among other things, the financial and competitive effects of
greenhouse gas emissions regulations, cap and trade systems, and similar
regulatory regimes to the extent such effects are material.42
Item 103 of Regulation S-K—Legal Proceedings—requires a registrant
to describe “any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary
routine litigation incidental to the business,” to which the registrant is a

35. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). The SEC’s Form 10-K specifies the information required in annual
reports and the SEC’s Form 10-Q specifies the information required in quarterly reports. Form 10K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2011); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308A (Form 10-Q).
36. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Fick, The Value of Good Corporate Disclosure, CPA J., 40–42 (Oct.
2010) (“For companies with little or no analyst coverage, SEC filings may be the only source
investors use to decide whether to buy or sell.”).
37. For example, Part I, Item I on Form 10-K requires the registrant to include information
required by Item 101 of Regulation S-K. Form 10-K, supra note 35, at 8.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2011).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a), (c).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii).
41. Id.
42. See Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,293, 6,296.
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party.43 “[O]rdinary routine litigation incidental to the business” does not,
however, include administrative or judicial proceedings “arising under any
Federal, State or local provisions that have been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or primary [sic]
for the purpose of protecting the environment.”44 Such proceedings must be
described if material to the registrant’s business or financial condition if
they involve a claim for damages exceeding 10 percent of the registrant’s
current assets, or if a governmental authority is a party to the proceeding
and the monetary sanctions sought exceed $100,000.45 So-called climate
change litigation is an example of the type of litigation of which Item 103
might require disclosure and discussion, assuming the materiality thresholds
for disclosure are met.46
Item 303 of Regulation S-K—Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A)—requires a
registrant to provide a narrative discussion of the material information
otherwise found in the financial statements included in the registrant’s
quarterly and annual reports.47 The MD&A should “enhance a reader’s
understanding of [the registrant’s] financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operations.”48 To that end, the SEC prescribes
disclosure concerning, among other things, a company’s liquidity, capital
resources, results of operations, off-balance sheet arrangements, if any, and
certain contractual obligations. More specifically, a registrant must
disclose:

43.
44.
45.
46.



“[A]ny known trends or any known demands, commitments,
events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably
likely to result in the registrant’s liquidity increasing or
decreasing in any material way;”49



“[M]aterial commitments for capital expenditures” and “any
known material trends, favorable or unfavorable, in the

17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
17 C.F.R. § 229.103(5).
Id.
See infra notes 319–23. For registrant disclosures in SEC filings pertaining to these cases
see, for example, Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Consolidated Financial
Statements n.6 (Commitments Guarantees and Contingencies), 85 (Carbon Dioxide Public
Nuisance Claims) (Feb. 25, 2011) (discussing claims at issue in Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co.);
Murphy Oil Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) Part I, Item 3—Legal Proceedings (Feb. 27, 2009)
(discussing claims at issue in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA); Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) Part I., Item 3—Legal Proceedings, Greenhouse Gas Lawsuit (Feb. 28, 2008)
(discussing claims at issue in Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp.).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), at Instruction No. 1.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1).
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registrant’s capital resources” and “any expected material
changes in the mix and relative cost of such resources”;50 and


“[A]ny unusual or infrequent events or transactions or any
significant economic changes that materially affected the amount
of reported income from continuing operations” and “any known
trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant
reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable
impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing
operations.”51

The MD&A “shall focus specifically on material events and
uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial
information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of
future financial condition.”52 The SEC has indicated that Item 303 imposes
a disclosure duty “where a trend, demand, commitment, event or
uncertainty is both [1] presently known to management and [2] reasonably
likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or
results of operation.”53 With respect to pending legislation or regulation, the
SEC has directed that where “regulations have been proposed which, if
promulgated, would require the expenditure by the Company” of material
capital resources, disclosure is required.54
In crafting its MD&A requirements, the SEC has to a certain extent
eschewed specific line item requirements in favor of flexible “principlesbased disclosure” and registrants’ judgments about materiality. The SEC
has done so in order for its disclosure requirements to “keep pace with the
evolving nature of business trends without the need to continuously amend
the text of the rule.”55 For this reason, crafting an MD&A that is responsive
to the SEC’s rules is arguably among the most difficult aspects of preparing
a quarterly or annual report and has prompted the SEC to issue MD&Aspecific guidance on several occasions.56
Although Item 303 does not specifically mention the environment as do
Item 101 and Item 103, the MD&A requirements are a likely, if not the
most likely, source of climate change disclosure principally because of their
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2).
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3).
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), at Instruction No. 3.
Exchange Act Release No. 6835, supra note 22, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,294.
See, e.g., Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 8182, 79 SEC
Docket 1251 (Jan. 28, 2003); Commission Statement About Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 8056, 2002
WL 77153 (Jan. 22, 2002); Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000
Issues and Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and
Municipal Securities Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 7558, 1998 WL 425894 (July 29, 1998);
Exchange Act Release No. 6835, supra note 22.
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intentionally broad scope. Because MD&A requires disclosure and
discussion of known material trends and uncertainties, registrants have no
doubt grappled with and will continue to grapple with the necessity of
disclosing and discussing the potential regulatory, financial, physical, and
other effects of climate change on their businesses. Such disclosures may
cover, for example, proposed legislation, the potential costs and effects of
compliance with international accords, and underlying regional and national
regulations for greenhouse gas reductions, investments in mitigation
technology, and competitive pressures resulting from production and
distribution of climate friendly or unfriendly products.57
Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K—Risk Factors—requires a company to
disclose and discuss “the most significant factors that make [an investment
in the registrant’s securities] speculative or risky.”58 For example, a
registrant in the beverage sector might identify water quality and scarcity as
a risk that, if realized, could negatively impact the registrant’s production
costs and capacity. Risk factor disclosure should clearly state the risk and
specify how that particular risk affects that particular registrant. In an effort
to avoid boilerplate language and inundating readers with every conceivable
risk, no matter how improbable, the SEC cautions registrants to avoid
presenting risks that could apply generally to all registrants.59 As the
science of climate change develops and consensus about its risks mature,
Item 503(c) would seemingly require disclosure and discussion of a host of
climate related risk factors. Already, some issuers have identified such
climate change related risks as: the effects of greenhouse gas emission
regulations and limits, natural disasters and geographic and topographic
changes, increased energy costs, and dwindling resources.60

57.
58.
59.
60.

See Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,294–95.
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2011).
Id.
For example, according to Exxon Mobil’s Annual Report:

Climate change and greenhouse gas restrictions. Due to concern over the risk of
climate change, a number of countries have adopted, or are considering the adoption of,
regulatory frameworks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These include adoption of
cap and trade regimes, carbon taxes, restrictive permitting, increased efficiency
standards, and incentives or mandates for renewable energy. These requirements could
make our products more expensive, lengthen project implementation times, and reduce
demand for hydrocarbons, as well as shifting hydrocarbon demand toward relatively
lower-carbon sources such as natural gas. Current and pending greenhouse gas
regulations may also increase our compliance costs, such as for monitoring or
sequestering emissions.
Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2011). Further, according to United
Parcel Service’s Annual Report:
We may be affected by global climate change or by legal, regulatory or market
responses to such potential change.
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Finally, Article 3 of Regulation S-X—General Instructions as to
Financial Statements—sets forth the requirements for registrants as to the
preparation and presentation of financial statements to be included in their
annual and quarterly reports.61 Article 3 prescribes the form and content of
the balance sheet, statement of income, and statement of cash flows, which
comprise the package of financial statements in a registrant’s SEC reports.62
As used in Regulation S-X, “financial statements” include any notes to the
statements and all related schedules.63 To promote conformity in
presentation, the SEC de facto requires financial statements to be prepared
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP);
“[f]inancial statements . . . which are not prepared in accordance with
[GAAP] will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate, despite footnote
or other disclosures . . . .”64 Thus, by necessity, when preparing their
financial statements, registrants must pay particular attention to GAAP
conventions and pronouncements of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB).65

Concern over climate change, including the impact of global warming, has led to
significant federal, state, and international legislative and regulatory efforts to limit
greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions. For example, in the past several years, the U.S.
Congress has considered various bills that would regulate GHG emissions. While these
bills have not yet received sufficient Congressional support for enactment, some form
of federal climate change legislation is possible in the future. Even in the absence of
such legislation, the Environmental Protection Agency, spurred by judicial
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, may regulate GHG emissions, especially aircraft or
diesel engine emissions, and this could impose substantial costs on us. These costs
include an increase in the cost of the fuel and other energy we purchase and capital
costs associated with updating or replacing our aircraft or trucks prematurely. Until the
timing, scope and extent of any future regulation becomes known, we cannot predict its
effect on our cost structure or our operating results. Notwithstanding our widely
recognized position as a leader in sustainable business practices, it is reasonably
possible, however, that such legislation or regulation could impose material costs on us.
Moreover, even without such legislation or regulation, increased awareness and any
adverse publicity in the global marketplace about the GHGs emitted by companies in
the airline and transportation industries could harm our reputation and reduce customer
demand for our services, especially our air services.
United Parcel Service Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2011).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01.
62. Id.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(b).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1).
65. According to the FASB:
Since 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been the designated
organization in the private sector for establishing standards of financial accounting that
govern the preparation of financial reports by nongovernmental entities. Those
standards are officially recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (Financial Reporting Release No. 1, Section 101, and reaffirmed in
its April 2003 Policy Statement) and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (Rule 203, Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended May 1973 and May
1979). Such standards are important to the efficient functioning of the economy
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Important among these pronouncements is FASB Accounting Standards
Codification Topic 450 (ASC 450), Accounting for Contingencies (formerly
Financial Accounting Standard No. 5), which sets forth the standards for
accrual and disclosure of loss contingencies in a registrant’s financial
statements.66 Examples of loss contingencies include risk of loss or damage
of property, actual or possible claims and assessments, and pending or
threatened litigation.67 ASC 450 loss contingencies are categorized as
“probable” (i.e., likely to occur), “reasonably possible” (i.e., less than likely
but more than remote) or “remote” (i.e., slight).68 Under current ASC 450
standards,69 a loss contingency must be accrued as a charge to a registrant’s
income if (a) the loss is probable (i.e., “it is probable that an asset [has]
been impaired or a liability [has] been incurred at the date of the financial
statements”) and (b) “[t]he amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.”70
Footnote disclosure of the nature of the loss contingency and an estimate of
the possible loss may be necessary for the financial statements not to be
misleading.71 If no accrual is made for a loss contingency because one of
these conditions is not met, disclosure in a footnote of the contingency is
still required when “there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss or an
additional loss may have been incurred.”72 Given the nature of climate
change and its forecast effects, many registrants may need to closely
scrutinize the propriety of accruals and disclosures for loss contingencies
because decisions about the allocation of resources rely heavily on credible, concise,
and understandable financial information.
The SEC has statutory authority to establish financial accounting and reporting
standards for publicly held companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Throughout its history, however, the Commission’s policy has been to rely on the
private sector for this function to the extent that the private sector demonstrates ability
to fulfill the responsibility in the public interest.
Facts About FASB, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=11761545
26495 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (emphasis omitted).
66. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION,
CONTINGENCIES (TOPIC 450) (2009) [hereinafter FASB CONTINGENCIES].
67. Id. at 05-10.
68. Id. at 25-1.
69. On July 20, 2010, the FASB issued an exposure draft containing proposed amendments to
ASC 450 that would require enhanced disclosure of qualitative and quantitative information about
loss contingencies. The exposure draft has been mired in controversy since its release and has yet
to be adopted. See generally Thomas A. Zaccaro & Adam D. Schneir, FASB Postpones Changes
to Loss Contingency Disclosure Requirements Amid Widespread Criticism, PAUL HASTINGS LLP
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/publicationdetail.aspx?publicationId=1775.
70. FASB CONTINGENCIES, supra note 66, at 25-2.
71. Id. at 25-3 to 25-7. Registrants “typically do not disclose an estimate of their loss exposure
due to the difficulty of providing an accurate figure. Companies frequently describe the basic
relevant facts and procedural history of the litigation or claim, and indicate the company’s general
position regarding the matter . . . .” Robert J. Malionek, et al. FASB Proposes Expanded
Disclosures Regarding Loss Contingencies, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (July 22, 2010),
http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&publication=3631.
72. FASB CONTINGENCIES, supra note 66, at 50-3.
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arising from these effects. It has been suggested that such disclosures or
accruals could be required for
[registrants] that emit significant levels of greenhouse gases and are
already subject to direct regulation of those emissions here or abroad,
companies considering major capital investments that are affected by new
and evolving regulatory treatment of greenhouse gas emissions, and
companies whose physical operations are at hazard due to developments
such as melting permafrost or storm damage.73

The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance periodically reviews
registrant filings to monitor compliance with the SEC’s disclosure
requirements.74 As part of this process, the SEC staff routinely issues
comment letters to registrants requesting clarification on disclosures
registrants made in prior filings, will make in future filings, and, in some
cases, requiring registrants to make amendments to prior filings in order to
correct what has been deemed to be a deficient disclosure. Each comment
letter gives registrants a timeframe with which to comply, and formal
responses must be filed with the SEC, making them publicly available.
While a registrant is not technically compelled to respond to a comment
letter, failure to do so can create problems. Registrants who fail to respond
may be required to disclose unresolved comments, face delayed approval of
their registration statements, and, in egregious cases, they may be referred
to the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, which has a number of
administrative and civil remedies at its disposal.
II. DISCLOSURE AND THE CONCEPT OF MATERIALITY
The concept of materiality is indeed critical to a registrant’s disclosure
analysis. Items 101, 103, and 303 of Regulation S-K discussed above
explicitly premise disclosure on an evaluation of the materiality of the
matters involved.75 Materiality judgments also suffuse the disclosures
included in a registrant’s financial statements under Article 3 of Regulation
S-X.76 Under Exchange Act Rule 12b-6,
The term “material,” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor

73. See Petition, supra note 2, at 15.
74. This process was given added importance upon passage of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Section 408 requires the SEC to review the periodic and annual filings of every registrant at least
once every three years. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 166 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2011) (Item 101); 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (Item 103); 17 CFR
§ 229.303(a) (Item 303).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01.
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would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the
securities registered.77

The SEC adopted this definition of materiality in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway.78 The
specific issue before the Court was the materiality of alleged omissions and
misstatements in a proxy statement.79 Information is material, the Court
held, if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”80 This standard, the
Court explained
does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable [shareholder] to change his
vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial
likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable [shareholder] as having significantly altered the “total mix” of
81
information made available.

In articulating this standard, the Court attempted to balance competing
concerns of the disclosure-based system of regulation under federal
securities law. On the one hand, the securities laws are intended “to ensure
disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the shareholders to
make an informed choice.”82 On the other hand, the securities laws were not
intended to lead to excessive liability or saturate the market with
insignificant information.83 In this respect, the concept of materiality helps
separate important, indeed material, information “from less important
information that would be extraneous or irrelevant to investors.”84

77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. Rule 12b-2 is made applicable to registrant disclosures in annual
reports on Form 10-Ks, the focus of this Article, by virtue of General Instruction B to Form 10-K.
Form 10-K, supra note 35, at 1; see also Securities Act of 1933, Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(“The term ‘material,’ when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase
the security registered.”); Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02(o), 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(o) (“The term
‘material,’ when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject,
limits the information required to those matters about which an average prudent investor ought
reasonably to be informed.”).
78. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 449.
81. Id. at 448 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
82. TSC Indus, Inc., 426 U.S. at 448.
83. Id.
84. Glenn F. Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray
Into the Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 368 (2000).
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Although in TSC Industries the Court concerned itself with the
materiality of alleged omissions and misstatements in a proxy statement, the
standard of materiality articulated by the Court has since been applied
throughout the securities laws and subsequent judicial opinions and remains
the touchstone test of materiality.85 This is not to say, however, that merely
because a standard was articulated that questions regarding its application
been or are easily resolved. As the standard itself suggests and as explained
by the Court, materiality is an inherently fact specific analysis.86 Thus,
through the years the Court, its subordinate courts,87 and even the SEC88
have on numerous occasions addressed various questions regarding the
standard’s application.
Notable among these occasions was the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal
1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.89 In Basic, the Court took up the
question of the materiality of inchoate developments, which for the sake of
illustration might include potential mergers, asset sales or acquisitions,
litigation, securities offerings, significant legislation or regulation, product
developments, and so forth.90 Specifically, Basic involved allegations that a
registrant had violated the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and
rules, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, by failing to disclose that it was in fact
engaged in negotiations to be acquired by a competitor and all the while
making public pronouncements denying the existence of the negotiations.91
Recognizing that the existence of the merger negotiations alone did not give
rise to a duty to disclose but that public denial of negotiations in the face of
actual negotiations did give rise to a duty not to mislead, the Court adopted,
for purposes of determining the materiality of such negotiations, the socalled “probability/magnitude” test of materiality.92 Under this test,
previously articulated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,93 materiality
85. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (quoting
materiality standards articulated in TSC Industries, Inc.).
86. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
87. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of “Material” in Securities
Law (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies at the Moritz Coll. Of Law, Working Paper
No. 145, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1772725 (“A
study of close to eight hundred cases in which a federal court’s [sic] applies the term [material] to
specific facts, however, finds that the case-law is, well, quixotic at best and fickle at worst.”).
88. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881, 2000
WL 1201556 (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting Regulation Fair Disclosure and setting forth certain types
of information or events that are potentially material); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64
Fed. Reg. 45150-01 (Aug. 19, 1999) [hereinafter SAB 99] (expressing the views of the SEC’s
staff that exclusive reliance on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality in preparing
financial statements and performing audits of those financial statements is inappropriate;
misstatements are not immaterial simply because they fall beneath a numerical threshold).
89. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
90. Id. at 226.
91. Id. at 227–28.
92. Id. at 238–41.
93. Id. at 238–39, 250 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
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depends “at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated
probability the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event
in the light of the totality of the company activity.”94
The materiality standards articulated in TSC Industries and Basic are an
essential part of the lexicon of lawyers whose job it is to counsel registrants
on their SEC disclosure obligations. But, as has been aptly observed, “the
difficulty lies not in the formulation, but in the application.”95 Much has
been written about the “elusiveness” of the concept of materiality and its
application.96 Even in the Interpretive Release, when addressing the
possibility of climate change disclosure as part of a registrant’s MD&A, the
SEC acknowledged that “[a]nalyzing the materiality of known trends,
events or uncertainties may be particularly challenging for registrants.”97
The “elusiveness” or difficulty of application notwithstanding, some
general principles regarding materiality can be articulated. First, materiality
is premised upon the importance of information to a “reasonable
investor.”98 It is therefore an objective rather than subjective standard.99
While the exact nature of the so-called “reasonable investor” has been the
subject of some dispute, such an investor has been described as
knowledgeable—though not necessarily “prudent” or “conservative”100 or
even sophisticated or “savvy,”101 but as one who “is presumed to have
information available in the public domain”102 and, importantly, one that
invests principally to make money.103 As one court has observed, “a
‘reasonable investor’ is neither an ostrich, hiding her head in the sand from
relevant information, nor a child, unable to understand the facts and risks of
investing.”104

94. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849).
95. J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 5.05[3][a] (Aspen
Publishers, Inc., 3d ed. 2011).
96. Id.; see also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff’d, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing materiality as an “elusive concept”); Oesterle, supra
note 87; Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal
Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2004) (“[T]he [materiality] concept
remains elusive.”).
97. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,295.
98. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
99. See id. at 450.
100. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
101. Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Even savvy investors may
recover when a bald lie understates the gravity of a known risk.” (citation omitted)).
102. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, 67 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1995).
103. See, e.g., Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 690 (2009) (“While carbon-impact information might be important to
the buying and selling decisions of some, even many, environmentally concerned individuals, the
legal standard is that of an objective ‘reasonable shareholder,’ who is presumed to invest in order
to make money.” (footnote omitted)).
104. Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 656 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Second, materiality is an “inherently fact-specific finding.”105 “Whether
or not any particular fact is material is a determination which clearly cannot
be made in a vacuum.”106 Thus, the analysis must occur in the context of the
registrant’s particular facts and circumstances and based upon information
available at the time the assessment is made.107 “[M]ateriality judgments
can properly be made only by those who have all the facts.”108 It follows
then that what may be material for one registrant may not necessarily be
material to another. Thus, a lack of disclosure cannot be treated as a prima
facie disregard for regulatory requirements or guidance.
Third, “the mere fact that an investor might find information interesting
or desirable is not sufficient to satisfy the materiality requirement.”109 To
this we might add that simply because one group of investors would like the
information does not by itself render the information material.110
Appropriately, there is a necessary distinction between what an investor or
shareholder might consider important as opposed to what the investor or
shareholder would consider important.111 Further, there must be a
“substantial likelihood” that, under all the circumstances, the information
105. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
106. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. See, e.g., Isquith v. Middle S. Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 201 n.9 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is
wrong to treat each individual piece of information separately, as if it had no relation to the other
pieces which surround it.”).
108. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
NO. 2, QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 45 (1980), available at
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156317989.
109. Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 969 (1st Cir. 1992).
110. Compare Petition, supra note 2, at 13 (“Under both Supreme Court and Commission
precedent, the existence of significant investor demand for information helps to guide the
determination of whether that information is material and hence required to be disclosed.”), with
Letter to John W. White, Dir. Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC (Sept. 18, 2007), available
at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/letter-to-SEC-division-of-corporation-finance.pdf (“As
documented in detail in our Petition, very extensive and broad-based investor demand for climate
risk information underscores the conclusion that this information is material to many corporations’
performance and operations, and critical to investors’ ability to make informed assessments about
corporate value.”). Whether climate change information is material simply because some investors
may want such information is undermined when results on climate change related shareholder
proposals are examined. In recent years, support for such proposals has averaged below 20
percent. See infra Part VII. Ceres reports that among mutual funds that “control a considerable
portion of the U.S. securities market,” support for climate change shareholder proposals has
actually decreased in recent years “from 27 percent in 2009 to 24 percent in 2010.” See New Ceres
Survey Data: U.S. Mutual Funds Backtrack in Supporting Climate Resolutions in 2010, CERES,
INC. (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/new-ceres-survey-data-u.s.
-mutual-funds-backtrack-in-supporting-climate-resolutions-in-2010/view.
111. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (“The potential liability
for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily
low, not only may the corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insignificant
omissions or misstatements, but also management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability
may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking. We agree with Judge Friendly, speaking for the
Court of Appeals in Gerstle [v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.], that the ‘might’ formulation is ‘too
suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely.’” (citation omitted)).
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would have assumed actual significance in a reasonable investor’s
investment decision.112
Fourth, materiality can be described as a predominantly economicoriented analysis, which is to say that social and moral considerations are
secondary, if not irrelevant, to the analysis.113 Important as such
considerations may seem, they undermine one of the purposes of
materiality: to keep disclosure tied to the purposes of the Securities laws,
including the protection of investors from fraudulent practices in the
securities markets. Recall that the legal standard is that of a “reasonable
shareholder,”114 which, as discussed, is one who, among other things,
invests principally to make money.115
Fifth, the materiality of a given fact may be judged by reference to the
likely market reaction to that fact and resulting movements in the
registrants’ stock price.116 The Staff of the SEC has opined that when
management expects that known information “may result in a significant
positive or negative market reaction, that expected reaction should be taken
into account.”117 Nevertheless, registrants should be cautious here because
consideration of potential market reaction is only one of the many factors

112. TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 448–49. Stated another way, “‘there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.’” Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449). With
regards to this “total mix” of information, the Supreme Court observed that “[a]ny approach that
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific
finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.” Basic, Inc., 485
U.S. at 232.
113. But see Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 292 (2009) (arguing that “there is justification for taking into
account the underlying moral issue when determining materiality to investors”).
114. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
115. Joo, supra note 103.
116. See, e.g., No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holdings,
320 F.3d 920, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) (“No significant change in the stock price is also strong
evidence that the information was immaterial. Conversely, the fact that a firm’s stock price does
significantly change is strong evidence of materiality.”); In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc.,
184 F.3d 280, 289–90 (3d Cir. 1999) (facts immaterial as a matter of law where they “‘would have
had no more than a negligible impact on a reasonable investor’s prediction of the firm’s future
earnings’”) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir.
1997); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1425 (information in “efficient”
market is material where it “alters the price of the firm’s stock”). See also SAB 99, supra note 88
(“Among other factors, the demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in
response to certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard
quantitatively small misstatements as material.”).
117. See also SAB 99, supra note 88.
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that ought to be considered.118 Indeed, a given fact may be judged material
even if it has no effect on the registrant’s stock price.119
Sixth, there is no generally accepted calculation or formula for
determining materiality. Both the SEC and courts have resisted bright-line
rules of materiality.120 In August 1999, SEC Staff issued Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, and addressed the practice adopted by some registrants and
their internal auditors of employing certain “rules of thumb” or thresholds
in evaluating whether items “might be considered material to users of a
registrant’s financial statements.”121 For example, one common “rule of
thumb” suggested that a misstatement or omission of an item in a
registrant’s financial statements that fell below a 5 percent threshold would
not be material “in the absence of particularly egregious circumstances,
such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior management.”122 Still,
the SEC reminded registrants, and their auditors, that “exclusive reliance on
this or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the accounting
literature or the law.”123
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may
provide the basis for a preliminary assumption that – without considering
all relevant circumstances – a deviation of less than the specified
percentage with respect to a particular item on the registrant’s financial
statements is unlikely to be material. The staff has no objection to such a
“rule of thumb” as an initial step in assessing materiality. But quantifying,
in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement is only the beginning
of an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute
for a full analysis of all relevant considerations. Materiality concerns the

118. Id. (“Consideration of potential market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself
‘too blunt an instrument to be depended on’ in considering whether a fact is material.” (citation
omitted)).
119. See, e.g., Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The district court
erred when it considered the movement in share price of a stock that did not trade on an efficient
market to determine materiality under the circumstances of this case.”); Greenhouse v. MCG
Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 660–61 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The majority rule seems to be that [stock
price movement] can be some evidence, but not, standing alone, dispositive evidence.”); U.S. v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]hether a public company’s stock price moves
up or down or stays the same after the filing of a Schedule 13D does not establish the materiality
of the statements made, though stock movement is a factor the jury may consider relevant.”).
120. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct 1309, 1318 (2011) (rejecting
assertion that “adverse event reports that do not reveal a statistically significant increased risk of
adverse events from product use are not material information” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting bright-line test for materiality and noting that “ease of
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress’
policy decisions”); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting
bright-line numerical tests for materiality and approving of SAB 99). “[A] court must consider
‘both ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ factors in assessing an item’s materiality . . . .” Id. (quoting
SAB 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45, 151).
121. SAB 99, supra note 88.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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significance of an item to users of a registrant’s financial statements. A
matter is “material” if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
person would consider it important.124

Thus, the SEC staff stated, registrants should take into account not only
quantitative factors of materiality, but also qualitative factors. These
qualitative factors might include whether the information, among other
things, is “capable of precise measurement or whether it arises from an
estimate,” “masks a change in earnings or other trends,” “concerns a
segment or other portion of the registrant’s business” that is important to its
operations or profitability, or “affects the registrant’s compliance with
regulatory requirements.”125
Seventh, for inchoate, contingent, or future events, the probability of
the event occurring must be weighed against the magnitude of the event.126
This, of course, is merely a restatement of the materiality standard
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. and discussed above.
Still, the standard bears repeating because, in the context of climate
change—particularly with regard to forecasts of physical impacts of
continued climate change—we are very much dealing with inchoate and
contingent events. To be sure, applying the probability/magnitude test is
more art than science. “Assessing magnitude requires some determination
of the degree of importance” of the development and assessing “probability
essentially requires a look into a crystal ball in an effort to determine the
likelihood the development will occur.”127 Registrants have struggled, and
will no doubt continue to struggle, with assessing the materiality of
developments that may not be probable, but could have a significant impact
on the issuer if they occurred (and vice versa).
There is one important caveat to any discussion of the
probability/magnitude test, and this is particularly important in the context
of registrant assessments of materiality and disclosure of climate change in
response to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, the MD&A: the
probability/magnitude test is not pertinent to Item 303 disclosure.128 Rather,
the SEC has prescribed its own standard to govern the circumstances in
which Item 303 requires disclosures. Where a trend, demand, commitment,
event or uncertainty is known, a registrant must make two assessments:
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 238–40 (1988)
BROWN, supra note 95, at 5.05[3][a].
See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 26831, 1989
WL 1092885, 6 n.27 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 26831]; see also
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5
and SK-303 differ significantly, the ‘demonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements
of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be required
under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown.’” (citations omitted)).
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Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not
reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.

2.

If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will
come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management
determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial
condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to
occur.129
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As the Interpretive Release makes clear, in the context of climate
change, this standard takes on increased importance as registrants assess the
materiality and need to disclose and discuss pending climate change
legislation, regulation, and international accords.130 For that purpose, the
SEC has articulated the Item 303 disclosure standard as follows:
First, management must evaluate whether the pending legislation or
regulation is reasonably likely to be enacted. Unless management
determines that it is not reasonably likely to be enacted, it must proceed on
the assumption that the legislation or regulation will be enacted. Second,
management must determine whether the legislation or regulation, if
enacted, is reasonably likely to have a material effect on the registrant, its
financial condition or results of operations. Unless management
determines that a material effect is not reasonably likely, MD&A
131
disclosure is required.

Eighth, information that is expressly required to be disclosed is
presumptively material—a concept sometimes called “line-item
materiality.”132 For example, as discussed above, Item 103 of Regulation SK explicitly requires disclosure of administrative or judicial proceedings
arising under any federal, state, or local environmental laws, where such
proceedings involve a claim for damages exceeding 10 percent of the
registrant’s current assets, or a governmental authority is a party to the
proceeding and the monetary sanctions sought exceed $100,000.133
Presumably, then, a registrant’s settlement of claims for violations of
environmental standards exceeding $100,000 brought by the EPA would be
considered presumptively material and would need to be disclosed.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Exchange Act Release No. 26831, supra note 128.
Interpretive Release, supra note 1.
Id. at 6,296 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 641 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989,
amended 1990) (“Disclosures mandated by law are presumably material.” (citation omitted));
Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws,
75 VA. L. REV. 723, 727 (1989) (“The particular items of information mandated to be disclosed in
the schedules under the registration and circular requirements of the 1933 Act or under sections
12, 13, and 14 of the 1934 Act are presumably automatically deemed to be ‘material.’”).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2011).
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Similarly, if the SEC were to amend Regulation S-K to specifically require
registrants to disclose annual greenhouse gas emissions, such information
would also be presumptively material.
Lastly, when in doubt, registrants are cautioned to err on the side of
disclosure. In articulating materiality standards, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that doubts as to the materiality of information would be
commonplace.134 Nonetheless, “particularly in view of the prophylactic
purpose of the Rule and the fact that the content of the proxy statement is
within management’s control, ‘it is appropriate that these doubts be
resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to protect.’”135 “Disclosure,
and not the paternalistic withholding of accurate information, [was] the
policy chosen and expressed by Congress” in adopting the securities
laws.136
III. TRENDS IN REGISTRANT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF THE INTERPRETIVE RELEASE
Before the SEC issued the Interpretive Release, several studies of
registrant SEC filings suggested that climate change related disclosure was
not particularly robust. A World Resources Institute study of 1998 and 1999
SEC filings of “13 leading, publicly listed companies in the U.S. pulp and
paper industry,”137 found that few of these companies “disclosed the
financial risks or potential competitive impacts arising from their exposures
to known environmental uncertainties.”138 In July 2004, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed (1) “how well the SEC
has defined the requirements for environmental disclosure” and (2) “the
extent to which companies are disclosing environmental information” in
their SEC filings.139 Surveying 2003 SEC filings for “20 U.S. electric utility
companies that were among the largest emitters of carbon dioxide,” the
GAO found that while only one company made no disclosures “regarding
greenhouse gas controls . . . the level of detail varied among the companies”

134.
135.
136.
137.

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
Id. (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 622 (1970)).
United States v. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
ROBERT REPETTO & DUNCAN AUSTIN, COMING CLEAN: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF
FINANCIALLY SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, WORLD RES. INST. ix (Kathleen Lynch, ed.,
2000), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/coming-clean-corporate-disclosure-financially
-significant-environmental-risks.
138. Id. at x.
139. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE:
SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 9–
16 (2004) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE], available at www.gao.gov/new.items
/d04808.pdf. The GAO study reviewed, in addition to its own selection of the SEC filings of
twenty U.S. electric utility companies, twenty-seven studies of registrant disclosure published
from 1995 to 2003. Id. The GAO characterized most of these studies as having “serious
limitations” including “small sample sizes and narrow focus.” Id. at 2, 4, 20–23, 39–42.
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and that no company “attempted to estimate the dollar value of the
impact.”140
Perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of pre-Interpretive Release
disclosure was published in early 2009 by Kevin L. Doran and Elias L.
Quinn, policy analysts at the Center for Energy and Environmental Security
at the University of Colorado Law School.141 In the 2009 study, Doran and
Quinn reviewed the Form 10-K filings of registrants in the S&P 500 for
each year between 1995 through 2008 for any mention of “climate change,”
“global warming,” and “greenhouse gas.” According to the authors,
“despite a growing awareness by corporate leaders regarding the strategic
importance of climate change, corporate disclosures of the risks and
opportunities created by climate change [were] the exception rather than the
norm.”142 In particular, Doran and Quinn observed that in 2008:
. . . 76.3% of the S&P 500 failed to provide any mention of climate change
in their 10-K filings . . . .
. . . [O]nly 5.5% of the S&P 500 identified at least one risk posed by
climate change and articulated a strategy for managing and mitigating that
risk . . . .

140. Id. at 20–21. The GAO also observed that
[o]f the 19 companies that provided information on the impact of potential controls
over greenhouse gas emissions,


7 disclosed such information only in the S-K item 101, “Description of
Business” section of the company’s 10-K or 10-Q reports;



2 disclosed information only in S-K items 301 and 302, “Selected Financial
Data” and “Supplementary Financial Information” sections of the company’s
10-K or 10-Q reports;



2 disclosed information only in S-K item 303, “‘Management’s Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” section of
the company’s 10-K or 10-Q reports; and



8 disclosed information in multiple sections of the 10-K, 10-Q, or the
company’s annual report to shareholders.

Id. at 23. For a complete list of the companies examined, see id., at 45–50.
141. Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn, Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by Sector
Analysis of SEC 10-K Filings from 1995- 2008, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 721 (2009). At
the time of publication, Doran was Senior Research Fellow and Quinn was Senior Policy Analyst
at the Center for Energy and Environmental Security, University of Colorado Law School.
142. Id. at 725. For the proposition that there is a “growing awareness by corporate leaders
regarding the strategic importance of climate change,” the authors cited a survey conducted by the
Pew Center on Global Climate Change of U.S. business leaders in which 90 percent of those
surveyed indicated that they believed climate change regulation is inevitable and 93 percent
considered climate related risks when making investment decisions. Id. at 104. See also ANDREW
J. HOFFMAN, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE:
CORPORATE STRATEGIES THAT ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2006) [hereinafter PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE], available at http://www.pewclimate.org/publications/report/gettingahead-curve-corporate-strategies-address-climate-change.

510

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

. . . [L]ess than ten percent of companies in the financial sector discussed
climate change in 10-K filings . . . .
. . . [O]nly 3.2% of utilities sector companies failed to mention climate
change in 10-K filings . . . .
[However], only 25.8% of utility companies met the standard of
identifying at least two climate change risks and articulating a
management and mitigation strategy for addressing one of those risks.143

In addition, a survey sponsored by The Corporate Library (now part of
Governance Metrics International (GMI))144 and the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres)145 was conducted of 100
global companies in the “electronic utilities, coal, oil and gas, [and]
transportation and insurance” sectors.146 The study evaluated whether
companies disclosed climate risks in their SEC filings and reported
findings, published in June 2009, similar to those in Doran and Quinn’s
report.147 This survey used the Global Framework for Climate Risk
Disclosure, a standardized reporting framework devised by a coalition of
large institutional investors,148 and assessed registrant filings in three main
categories: “(1) emissions and climate change position, (2) risk assessment,
and (3) actions to address climate risks and opportunities.”149 Registrant
disclosures were described as “None,” “Poor,” “Limited,” or “Fair,” with
“None” being the lowest and “Fair” indicating the highest quality disclosure
found in the report.150 Key findings of the report for each of the sectors
studied were as follows:
Electric Utilities: Disclosure was widespread but minimal. None of the 26
companies studied achieved a “Fair” rating on disclosure of emissions and
climate change position, only 3 out of 26 companies (12%) ranked “Fair”
on climate risk assessment, and only 2 out of 26 companies (8%) provided
“Fair” disclosure of actions to address climate change. Seven of the
companies studied provided no information on actions to address climate
143. HOFFMAN, supra note 142, at 725 (internal citations omitted).
144. “GMI Ratings offers a specialized corporate governance risk portfolio assessment service
covering individual investment funds and internally and externally managed portfolios.”
Investment Professionals, GMI RATINGS, http://www3.gmiratings.com/?page_id=103 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2011). “The world’s leading investment professionals employ GMI Ratings’
comprehensive governance data and research as part of their suite of analysis solutions.” Id.
145. CERES is “a non-profit organization that leads a national coalition of investors,
environmental organizations and other public interest groups working with companies to address
sustainability challenges such as global climate change and water scarcity.” About INCR, CERES,
http://www.ceres.org/incr/about (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
146. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, ET AL., CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS IV (June
2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS], available at http://www.ceres
.org/resources/reports/climate-risk-disclosure-2009.
147. CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS, supra note 146.
148. Id.
149. Id. at IV–V.
150. Id. at 12–13.
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change. Nevertheless, the electric power sector ranked higher than the
other sectors . . . .
Coal: All six coal companies surveyed included some disclosure of
climate change issues in their 10-K filings, though only one achieved a
“Fair” score in any of the three categories analyzed. Coal companies’
strongest disclosure was in the area of risk assessment; five of the
companies provided disclosure in this category that was rated “Limited” or
“Fair.” . . .
Oil and Gas: The majority of the 23 companies studied provided some
disclosure on climate risk assessment, but disclosure was weak with none
ranking “Fair” and 22 out of 23 (96%) scored as “Limited” or “Poor.”
Disclosure in the other two categories was even more limited. Twelve out
of 23 companies (52%) provided no disclosure on actions to address
climate change, while 17 out of 23 companies (74%) disclosed no
information on their emissions or climate change position. . . .
Transportation: Companies in this sector provided minimal disclosure in
SEC filings. Only 5 of 19 (26%) disclosed their emissions or their climate
change position, and none were ranked as “Fair” for this disclosure. . . .
[N]ot a single company disclosed emissions associated with vehicle use.
Transportation companies provided somewhat more informative
disclosure on climate risk and actions to address climate change, with 68%
providing some disclosure in each of these categories. The disclosure was
weak, however, and did not meet investors’ needs. Only 3 companies
scored “Fair” on climate risk assessment and 2 scored “Fair” on their
actions to address climate risks. . . .
Insurance: Although prudent risk assessment is the basis for a viable
insurance industry, the 27 companies studied in this sector provided the
least disclosure across the board compared to other sectors. Eighteen out
of 27 companies (67%) had no mention of climate change or related risks
anywhere in their SEC filings. Twenty-three out of 27 companies (85%)
failed to disclose their emissions or a statement on climate change, while
24 out of 27 companies (89%) omitted disclosure on actions to address
climate change, despite the wide range of opportunities for new, climate151
related insurance products.

Still, some pre-Interpretive Release studies found modest improvements
in climate change related disclosure over time. In October 2006, Friends of
the Earth issued its most recent annual survey of climate change disclosure
in the SEC filings of 112 registrants in the automobile and energy
industries.152 The survey found modest improvements in climate change
151. Id. at v.
152. See MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS

OF THE EARTH, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS,
PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES COMPANIES 3 (Oct. 2006), available at http://cdm266901
.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p266901coll4/id/2787/rec/19.
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disclosure since the benchmark year of 2000. Specifically, they found an
overall climate change disclosure rate of 49 percent compared to a 26
percent disclosure rate in 2000.153 Yet, “reporting rates between the various
sectors varie[d] substantially.”154 The most common types of climate
change reporting included “discussion of the Kyoto Protocol and other
climate legislation/regulations, the financial impact of these policies on the
company’s sector and business, and the firm’s response to these
policies.”155 The biggest improvements in climate change disclosure were
seen in the SEC filings of companies in the oil and gas sector. From 2000 to
2006, oil and gas company climate change disclosure doubled from 37
percent to 78 percent.156 Nevertheless, disclosure rates in other sectors, most
notably insurance, petrochemical, automotive, and utilities, remained much
lower.157
In addition, McGuireWoods LLP reviewed the 2009 SEC filings made
by 400 registrants in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap
600 indices. This study found that “the number of companies making
disclosures about GHG emissions and climate change in their [Form] 10-Ks
increased in 2009 compared to 2008.”158 Even so, the McGuireWoods study
found that the number of companies that made any disclosure was “still
relatively small.”159 Of the registrants reviewed, “17.3% made some type of
climate change or GHG disclosure in 2009, compared to 12.2% in 2008.”160
For its study, McGuireWoods looked for disclosures addressing any one or
more of the following: amount of greenhouse gas emissions; impacts/risks
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id. “Companies are also increasingly disclosing carbon dioxide emissions, and highlighting
climate issues by dedicating discrete sections to this topic in SEC filings, or listing climate change
as a Key Risk Factor.” Id.
The survey also [found] that companies differ[ed] in their assessment of financial risks
posed by climate change. While about 16 percent of reporting companies avoided the
“bottom line” question, the remainder of climate reporters tried to address how climate
policies could impact them: 9 percent of reporting companies addressed this question
by simply saying that it was impossible to predict the financial impact of climate risks.
49 percent of climate reporters admitted that climate-related risks could indeed pose a
material adverse impact on the firm or create significant new costs, even though these
costs were often difficult to estimate. 15 percent of companies said that climate risks
would have mixed results on their firm, while 11 percent concluded that global
warming would pose little or no impact.
Id.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. JANE WHITT SELLERS

ET AL., MCGUIREWOODS LLP, CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE:
CREEPING UP THE LEARNING CURVE—WILL DISCLOSURE CATCH UP WITH DEVELOPMENTS? 10
(Oct. 2009), available at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/climate
%20change%20disclosure%202009.pdf.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 10.
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related to current or proposed greenhouse gas regulations; impacts/risks
related to the physical effects of climate change; legal proceedings relating
to greenhouse gas emissions or climate change; and efforts related to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions or climate change.161 The
McGuireWoods study found that:


59 (83.1% of the 71 companies making some type of disclosure)
addressed impacts/risks related to current or proposed regulation
of GHG emissions.



25 (35.2%) discussed efforts related to reducing GHG emissions.



17 (23.9%) discussed physical impacts/risks related to climate
change.



12 (16.9%) provided disclosure regarding the amount of their
GHG emissions.



7 (9.9%) disclosed legal proceedings related to GHG emissions
or climate change.

The risk factors section was the most common section in which
disclosures appeared. Out of the companies making 10-K disclosures, 54
(76.1%) included risk factors addressing GHG emissions or climate
change. Companies also made disclosures in the following sections of
their 10-Ks: Item 101 – Business (36), Forward-Looking Statement Safe
Harbor disclosures (28), MD&A (22), and Item 103 – Legal Proceedings
(4).
Eleven companies made disclosures in other portions of the 10-K,
typically in the notes to the financial statements. Some companies also
made disclosures regarding the relationship between climate change/GHG
162
initiatives and executive compensation.

As McGuireWoods and others have highlighted, it is likely that preInterpretive Release disclosures were propelled by the well-publicized
settlement agreements entered into by the New York State Attorney General
and several energy companies in 2008.163 In late 2007, the Attorney
General, relying upon New York’s broad anti-fraud statute, the Martin
Act,164 issued subpoenas to five large power companies—AES Corporation,
Dominion, Dynegy, Peabody Energy and Xcel Energy—seeking a variety

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 11.
See The Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. §§ 352–353. See generally Nicholas Thompson,
The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2004, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June
-2004/feature_thompson_mayjun04.msp (“A little-known law called the Martin Act gives New
York’s attorney general extraordinary power, yet for 75 years this Excalibur has been left to rust
in its scabbard.” (emphasis omitted)).
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of internal documents.165 In letters accompanying the subpoenas, the
Attorney General questioned whether these companies’ investors were
receiving adequate information about the financial liabilities of carbon
dioxide emissions, stating that “[s]elective disclosure of favorable
information or the omission of unfavorable information concerning climate
change is misleading.”166 The investigations resulted in settlement
agreements, most notably with Dynegy and Xcel. Under these agreements,
both companies agreed to include in their Form 10-K filings detailed
disclosures about the “material financial risks to the Company associated
with the regulation of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions in relation to
climate change,” and more specifically, an analysis of the financial risks
associated with climate change regulation, climate change litigation, and the
physical impacts of climate change.167 These settlement agreements
prompted a number of law firms to counsel their clients to reexamine the
climate change disclosures in their SEC filings.168
IV. THE PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE AND THE
SEC’S RESPONSE
Given the findings of these and other studies,169 and the prevalence of
the climate change debate, it was not surprising that the SEC was asked to
jump into the fray. The GAO report, mentioned above in Part III,
highlighted widespread disagreement among “[k]ey stakeholders [as to]
how well [the] SEC has defined the requirements for environmental

165. See Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html.
166. Id. (quoting NY Attorney General’s Office).
167. Kevin Poloncarz & Amy June, BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, New York Attorney General
Reaches Major Settlements with Power Producers Regarding Disclosure of Risks of Climate
Change (Dec. 9, 2008) (quoting the Xcel & Dynegy agreements), available at
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Bingham-McCutchen-LLP_581598.htm.
168. See, e.g., Seth Kerschner, Power Companies Agree to Expanded Disclosure of Climate
Change Risk in Landmark Settlements with New York Attorney General, 61 A.B.A. ENVTL.
DISCLOSURE COMM. NEWSL. 1, 2, 5 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://sherman.com/powercompanies-agree-to-expanded-disclosure-of-climate-change-risk-in-landmark-settlements-withnew-york-attorney-general; MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, DISCLOSURE, MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELATING TO CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCIAL RISKS
(UPDATED) (2009), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/CCLF_ClimateChange
FinancialRisks-Updated_5jan091.pdf.
169. See, e.g., DAVID GARDINER ET AL., CERES, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE BY THE S&P 500
(2007), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/climate-risk-disclosure-by-the-s-p500/view. This report analyzed the “climate risk disclosure practices among . . . S&P 500
companies” and “was based [upon] company responses to a questionnaire sent to companies in
February 2006 by the Carbon Disclosure Project,” rather than SEC filings. Id. at ii. “A total of 228
companies[,] 47 percent of the . . . companies surveyed[,] responded to the . . . questionnaire.” Id.
at 1. Nearly a third of respondents did not allow their responses to be made public prompting the
authors to conclude that “U.S. companies lag well behind their foreign competitors in climate risk
disclosure.” Id.
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disclosure”170 and recommended new, albeit limited, procedures “[t]o
improve the [SEC’s] tracking and transparency of information on
environmental disclosure problems.”171 Calls for enhancements to registrant
disclosure obligations came from other quarters and have been well
documented elsewhere.172 In September 2007, representatives of several
large institutional investors and other investor advocacy groups submitted a
petition to the SEC asking it to issue interpretive guidance on registrant
disclosure obligations.173 These petitioners included, among others, the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the California
State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), F&C Management, the
New Jersey State Investment Council, the New York State Common
Retirement Fund, and the fiduciaries of numerous other state pension funds,
whose investment portfolios are valued in the aggregate at well over $1
trillion.174
Importantly, the petitioners did not ask the SEC to adopt new rules or
impose new disclosure obligations on registrants. Rather, they requested
that the SEC clarify what “material climate-related information must be
included in corporate disclosures under existing law.”175 Specifically, the
petitioners sought SEC guidance addressing registrant disclosure of


Physical risks associated with climate change that are material to
a registrant’s operations or financial condition,



Financial risks and opportunities associated with present or
probable greenhouse gas regulation; and



Legal proceedings relating to climate change.176

In addition,
Notwithstanding the plain terms of Regulation S-K [and Regulation S-X,
petitioners argued that] “corporate practice on climate risk disclosure is
lagging behind the rapidly evolving economic, legal, and scientific
developments related to climate change. The low rate of meaningful
climate risk disclosure and the inconsistency of how companies are
170. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE, supra note 139, at 39, 36, 9–16.
171. Id. at 36–37.
172. See Scott D. Deatherage, The SEC Enters the Fray on Climate Risk Disclosure, 25 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 35, 35, 39 (2011); McFarland, supra note 113, at 292–95 (describing the
GRI, CERES, and CDP programs); Edmund L. Andrews, Candidates Offer Different Views on
Energy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at C1.
173. See Petition, supra note 2, at 2–3, 58. The SEC received other petitions concerning climate
change disclosure. See also Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,291 n.20.
174. See Petition, supra note 2, app. at A-1 to A-7.
175. Petition, supra note 2, at 2. Contra McFarland, supra note 113, at 285, 306 (“This Article
argues for mandatory disclosure of climate change risk in periodic reports filed under securities
laws . . . .”), with Andrew Schatz, Note, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information
Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 335, 367 (2008) (arguing for mandatory disclosure of
greenhouse gas emissions).
176. Petition, supra note 2, at 52; see also McFarland, supra note 113, at 305.
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addressing this subject in their [SEC] filings are denying investors the
information they need and demand about climate risk.”177

Of course the starting point for this assertion is that climate change is in
fact occurring.178 Assuming this is true, petitioners argued, the rapidly
changing regulatory environment for greenhouse gas emissions and the
physical effects of climate change pose unique and arguably material risks
to, and in some cases opportunities for, registrants.179 These risks include
the costs of complying with, as well as accommodating the registrant’s
business and operations to, the growing array of international, national,
state, and local measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. In
addition, changing temperatures, rising sea levels, more severe weather
patterns, changes in precipitation, and abnormal changes in climate patterns
“will have economic impacts on businesses, including the continued use of
corporate facilities in vulnerable locations and the viability of the other
businesses in their supply chain.”180 Because “[t]he costs and opportunities
associated with the changing regulatory and physical environments bear
directly on the financial condition and operations of many companies,” the
petitioners argued that “[c]limate risk has simply become too important to
corporate performance to be left out of mandatory disclosures under the
securities laws and the [SEC’s] rules.”181
Nearly three years after receiving the petition, the SEC responded. In
January 2010, by a vote of three to two, the SEC Commissioners approved
an Interpretive Release outlining the SEC’s “views with respect to [the
SEC’s] existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change
matters.”182 The Interpretive Release did not create new disclosure
requirements or modify existing ones; it was “merely intended to provide
clarity and enhance consistency.”183 To that end, the SEC reiterated the
current disclosure rules contained in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X,
which may require climate change disclosure, and, within the context of
those rules, highlighted four topics that registrants ought to consider: the
impact of climate change legislation and regulation, the impact of
international climate change accords, the indirect consequences of climate

177. Petition, supra note 2, at 20 (arguing for mandatory disclosure of greenhouse gas
emissions) (citation omitted).
178. See id. at 6 (“The empirical evidence that human activities are changing the global climate
in significant ways, and at an accelerating pace, is now overwhelming.”).
179. Id. at 6–7.
180. Id. at 28.
181. Id. at 8, 29.
182. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,290.
183. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement Before the Open Commission Meeting on
Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-climate.htm.
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change regulation on business trends, and the physical impacts of climate
change.184
As to the first of these topics—the impact of climate change
legislation—the Interpretive Released discussed the “significant
developments in federal and state legislation and regulation regarding
climate change.”185 Among the developments cited were regional, state, and
local efforts to regulate and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, such as
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative, and the
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord.186 Also cited were
legislative efforts at the federal level187 and EPA regulations which, as of
January 1, 2010, require large emitters of greenhouse gases to collect and
report data concerning their greenhouse gas emissions.188
The Interpretive Release stressed that these developments “may trigger
disclosure obligations under [SEC] rules and regulations, such as pursuant
to Items 101, 103, 503(c) and 303 of Regulation S-K.”189
Similarly, according to the Interpretive Release, the second of the four
topics—the impact of international climate change accords—could
implicate the same disclosure obligations mentioned above.190 Here, the
SEC cited the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union’s Emissions Trading
System, and the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Climate Conference,
“which may lead to future international treaties focused on remedying
environmental damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions” and could
therefore ultimately have a “material impact on registrants [who] file
disclosure documents with the [SEC].”191 The Interpretive Release
cautioned that “[r]egistrants ‘whose businesses are reasonably likely to be
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See Interpretive Release, supra note 1.
Id. at 6,290.
Id. at 6,290 n.7.
Id. At 6,290–91.
Id. at 6,290.
Id. at 6,295.

Examples of possible consequences of pending legislation and regulation related
to climate change include:


Costs to purchase, or profits from sales of, allowances or credits under a “cap
and trade” system;



Costs required to improve facilities and equipment to reduce emissions in
order to comply with regulatory limits or to mitigate the financial
consequences of a “cap and trade” regime; and



Changes to profit or loss arising from increased or decreased demand for
goods and services produced by the registrant arising directly from
legislation or regulation, and indirectly from changes in costs of goods sold.

Id.

190. Id. at 6,290 n.1.
191. Id. at 6,291.
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affected by such agreements should monitor the progress of any potential
agreements and consider the possible impact in satisfying their disclosure
obligations . . . .’”192
Next, the Interpretive Release discussed the importance of considering
the indirect consequences and opportunities of climate change regulation on
business trends.193 These indirect consequences could include:


Decreased demand for goods that produce significant greenhouse
gas emissions;



Increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions than
competing products;



Increased competition to develop innovative new products;



Increased demand for generation and transmission of energy from
alternative energy sources; and



Decreased demand for services related to carbon-based energy
sources, such as drilling services or equipment maintenance
services.194

Another indirect consequence of climate change regulation could
include any potential adverse consequences to a registrant’s reputation and
the effects that such reputational damage could have on that registrant’s
financial condition or business operations.195 Here, the Interpretive Release
encouraged registrants to consider possible risk factor disclosure under Item
503(c) of Regulation S-K if the registrant’s business was particularly
sensitive to public opinion and perception.196
Finally, the Interpretive Release encouraged registrants to consider the
physical impacts of climate change.197 Citing the “[s]ignificant physical
effects of climate change,” including “effects on the severity of weather . . .
sea levels, the arability of farmland, and water availability and quality,” the
SEC reminded companies that their businesses may be facing material risks
stemming from these effects.198 Such material risks include, for example:

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.



. . . [P]roperty damage and disruptions to operations, including
manufacturing operations or the transport of manufactured
products;



Indirect financial and operational impacts from disruptions to the
operations of major customers or suppliers from severe weather .
..;

Id. at 6,296.
Id. at 6,291.
Id. at 6,296 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 6,294.
Id. at 6,296–97.
Id. at 6,296 (footnotes omitted).
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Increased insurance claims and liabilities for insurance and
reinsurance companies;



Decreased agricultural production capacity in areas affected by
drought or other weather-related changes; and



Increased insurance premiums and deductibles, or a decrease in
the availability of coverage . . . .199
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The Interpretive Release also addressed the reporting of climate change
related information by registrants to various voluntary disclosure initiatives
such as the Climate Registry,200 the Carbon Disclosure Project,201 and the
Global Reporting Initiative.202 Observing that “much more information”
relative to registrants’ greenhouse gas emissions and climate change
responses is “publicly available outside of [registrants’] disclosure
documents filed with the SEC as a result of [these] voluntary disclosure
initiatives,” the SEC cautioned that “registrants should be aware that some
of the information they may be reporting pursuant to these [voluntary]
mechanisms also may be required to be disclosed in filings made with the
[SEC] pursuant to existing disclosure requirements.”203
Advocates of enhanced registrant disclosure in SEC filings have
criticized voluntary reporting mechanisms as being, although helpful,
decentralized and insufficient.204 Presumably, these same advocates would
like to see registrants’ SEC filings include the same information heretofore
199. Id. at 6,297.
200.
The Climate Registry is a nonprofit collaboration among North American States,
provinces, territories, and Native Sovereign Nations that sets consistent and transparent
standards to calculate, verify and publicly report greenhouse gas emissions into a single
registry. The Registry supports both voluntary and mandatory reporting programs and
provides comprehensive, accurate data to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
About Mission, THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2011).
201. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) collects and distributes climate change information.
Over 3,000 organizations in some sixty countries around the world now measure and disclose their
greenhouse gas emissions, water management, and climate change strategies through CDP. This
data is made available for use by a wide audience including institutional investors, corporations,
policymakers and their advisors, public sector organizations, government bodies, academics, and
the public. See generally THE CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/en-US
/Pages/HomePage.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
202. The Global Reporting Initiative sets out the principles and performance indicators that
organizations can use “to measure and report their economic, environmental, social and
governance performance.” What is GRI?, THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www
.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 21,
2011). Sustainability reports based on the GRI framework are used to benchmark performance
against climate change accords, laws, and other standards. See id.
203. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,292.
204. See, e.g., Coburn et al., supra note 19, at 2 (“And while voluntary reporting on climate
risks is helpful, it is not sufficient. Investors need information that is standardized and regulated,
and they need to be able to find that information in one place.”).
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disclosed voluntarily as a means of bolstering the possibility of a
registrant’s liability under the antifraud provisions in the federal securities
laws, a topic discussed in greater detail in Part VI.
Ultimately, the Interpretive Release attempts, but fails, to walk a fine
line between taking sides in the climate change debate and merely
reminding registrants of their existing disclosure obligations. Referring to
the Interpretive Release, SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro argued that “the
Commission is not making any kind of statement regarding the facts as they
relate to the topic of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming.’ . . . Nothing that
the Commission does today should be construed as weighing in on those
topics.”205 Yet, the Interpretive Release was, and remains, controversial
precisely because it seemed the SEC was indeed embracing the science of
climate change. This fact did not go unnoticed by two of Chairman
Shapiro’s co-commissioners.206 Referencing the 2007 GAO Report
205. See Shapiro, supra note 183.
206.
There is undoubtedly a constituency that is interested in, and has long pressed the
Commission to require, more extensive disclosures on environmental issues in order to
drive particular environmental policy objectives. The issuance of this release, however,
at a time when the state of the science, law and policy relating to climate change appear
to be increasingly in flux, makes little sense.
....
. . . I can only conclude that the purpose of this release is to place the imprimatur of the
Commission on the agenda of the social and environmental policy lobby, an agenda that
falls outside of our expertise and beyond our fundamental mission of investor
protection.
See Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting: Interpretive Release
Regarding Disclosure of Climate Change Matters (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710klc-climate.htm.
To me, the effect of the discussions is to find the Commission joining the ongoing
debate over climate change by lending support to a particular view of climate change.
Although the release does not expressly take sides, the release emphasizes the
‘“concerns”‘ and potential harms of climate change and discusses a range of regulatory
and legislative developments, along with international efforts, aimed at regulating and
otherwise remedying causes of climate change. In particular, the release highlights new
EPA regulations, proposed “cap-and-trade” legislation, the Kyoto Protocol (which the
U.S. has not ratified), the European Union Emissions Trading System, and recent
discussions at the United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen. While the
release stresses the risks of climate change and ongoing efforts to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions in the U.S. and abroad, the release fails to recognize that the climate
change debate remains unsettled and that many have questioned the appropriateness of
the regulatory, legislative, and other initiatives aimed at reducing emissions that the
release features. In short, I am troubled that the release does not strike a more neutral
and balanced tone when it comes to climate change — an area far outside this agency’s
expertise.
Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Statement Regarding Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/2010/spch012710tap-climate.htm.
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discussed in Part III above, which cited “a number of sources to support the
view that severe weather scenarios will increase as a result of climate
change brought on by an overabundance of greenhouse gases,” the SEC
states matter-of-factly that these “[s]ignificant physical effects of climate
change . . . have the potential to have a material effect on a registrant’s
business and operations.”207 At least one commissioner expressed concern
that the SEC was venturing far beyond its area of expertise.208 For that
reason, the Interpretive Release sparked a measure of controversy when it
was adopted.209
Controversy aside, the Interpretive Release is important because it put
registrants on notice that the SEC would devote greater attention to climate
change disclosure. The SEC indicated that it would step up its monitoring
of company disclosure, solicit additional advice and recommendations from
its Investor Advisory Committee, and hold a public roundtable on climate
change disclosure to “determine whether further guidance or rulemaking
relating to climate change disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”210 Whether this greater
attention has in fact panned out is debatable, but the possibility of increased
SEC scrutiny prompted law firms of all sizes to counsel their clients to
revisit their disclosure controls and procedures, and stay up-to-date on
legislative and regulatory developments. Following the SEC’s issuance of
the Interpretive Release, it is safe to say that registrants have devoted
greater resources to the issue of climate change and disclosure, achieving
what was no doubt one of the likely purposes of the Interpretive Release.
V. TRENDS IN REGISTRANT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
FOLLOWING ISSUANCE OF THE INTERPRETIVE RELEASE
Clearly, petitioners hoped SEC guidance would increase registrant
climate change disclosure, and perhaps quickly. This raises several
207. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,297, 6,291.
208. See Paredes, supra note 206.
209. See id. See generally Kara Scannell & Siobhan Hughes, Divided SEC Makes Climate
Another ‘Risk’, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2010, at C1; Editorial, Insecurity and Change Commission;
Never Mind Madoff, SEC Gumshoes Are on the Climate Beat, WALL ST. J. (ONLINE), Jan. 29,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575031441340842392.html;
Roadmap for Disclosure or Recipe for Boilerplate? The SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance for
Climate Change Disclosures,
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaId=10327; Joey Tsu-Yi-Chen, Green SOX for
Investors: Requiring Companies to Disclose Risks Related to Climate Change, 5 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 325, 342 (2010).
210. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,297. The SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee was
formed on June 3, 2009 to advise the SEC on matters of concern to investors, “provide the [SEC]
with investors’ perspectives on current, non-enforcement, regulatory issues and serve as a source
of information and recommendations to the [SEC] regarding the [SEC’s] regulatory programs
from the point of view of investors.” Id. at 6,297 n.78 (citation omitted). As discussed infra Part
VI, the Investor Advisory Committee has since been disbanded and the SEC has not yet organized
a replacement though one has been authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act.
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questions. Has registrant climate change disclosure increased following the
Interpretive Release? Is an increase in disclosure alone an appropriate
metric for judging registrant response to the Interpretive Release? Lastly, if
climate change disclosure has not in fact increased, why has it not?
Post-Interpretive Release observations suggest that registrant climate
change disclosure has indeed increased, albeit modestly. In October 2010,
the proxy advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), published
a review of registrant post-Interpretive Release climate change
disclosures.211 ISS reviewed the Form 10-K annual report filings of the 100
largest registrants in the United States—“irrespective of sector” by market
capitalization—that had filed their Form 10-K with the SEC in the first
quarter of 2010.212 Like the 2009 Doran and Quinn study discussed in Part
III above,213 ISS’s review involved searching these registrants’ Form 10-Ks
for such keywords as “climate change,” “carbon dioxide,” “greenhouse
gas,” and “energy use.”214 The ISS study then noted the following levels of
disclosure: any mention of climate risk, mention of regulatory risk, mention
of physical risk, and mention of product opportunities.215 Using this
methodology, ISS found that few of the registrants reviewed addressed all
the issues outlined in the Interpretive Release, and only 20 percent
addressed both regulatory and physical risks from climate change.216
Further,


[j]ust over half (51) of the 100 companies analyzed in this report
mention climate change in their 2009 Form 10-K filings and most
do not outline company-specific risks.
....



Quantification of climate risks and articulation of mitigation
strategies are largely absent from 2009 statements.



22% of companies discuss ways in which their products and
business lines might take advantage of climate change
opportunities.

211. See MALLIKA PAULRAJ, ISS CORPORATE SERVICES, DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS: HOW
100 COMPANIES ARE RESPONDING TO NEW SEC GUIDELINES (Oct. 2010) (on file with author)
[hereinafter DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS].
212. Id. at 8 (“Companies across all sectors were selected to provide the most representative
picture of how American industry is responding to growing requests for climate change
disclosure. This is in contrast to other disclosure studies that have focused exclusively on
companies from carbon-intensive sectors like utilities and energy.”).
213. See Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn, supra note 141, at 728.
214. DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS, supra note 211, at 8.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 7.
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Only 24% of companies address physical risks to their assets
posed by climate change.217

ISS also found, not surprisingly, that “[c]limate risk disclosure varies
considerably both within industry sectors and between sectors” and that the
energy and utility sectors “lead in climate risk disclosure due to the carbonintensive nature of their businesses.”218 In this respect, the ISS study is
encouraging because it suggests that the registrants most obviously affected
by the Interpretive Release—carbon-intensive sectors like utilities and
energy—are actively considering and disclosing the potential effects of
climate change on their businesses.
While the ISS review is helpful, two defects preclude it from
definitively answering the question of whether registrant climate change
disclosure has actually increased following the Interpretive Release. First,
the review sample data is too close in time to the date the Interpretive
Release was issued, a fact which, in fairness to ISS, it acknowledged.219 The
Form 10-K annual reports reviewed by ISS were all filed during the first
quarter of 2010, the same time the Interpretive Release was issued. Since
ISS selected the 100 largest registrants by market capitalization, it is
presumed that each of these registrants were “large accelerated filers” and
that their Form 10-Ks for the preceding fiscal year would have been due to
the SEC no later than sixty days after the end of the fiscal year—roughly
March 1, 2010.220 By the time the Interpretive Release was issued, these
217. Compare id. at 7, with Hurry Up and Wait: 2010 Climate Change Disclosure May Impact
2012 Proxy Access, MCGUIREWOODS LLP (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com
/newsresources/news/5233.asp?SearchFor=hurry%20up%20and%20wait.
No one should be terribly surprised to read the [report], which suggests that the volume
of climate change disclosure did not meaningfully increase as a result of the
[Interpretive] Release.
We believe the timing of the [Interpretive] Release, coupled with the impossibility of
predicting what form of climate change regulation or legislation is reasonably likely to
be enacted – let alone the material consequences that could result from all the different
forms being proposed in Congress, at the EPA, at the state level, and internationally –
made disclosure changes in 2010 nearly impossible. We also believe that public
companies in the energy industry for whom these issues are clearly material had an
established practice of focusing on them, and their disclosure was largely already
solidified in this area (as the release acknowledged).
Hurry Up and Wait: 2010 Climate Change Disclosure May Impact 2012 Proxy Access,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/news
/5233.asp?SearchFor=hurry%20up%20and%20wait.
218. DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS, supra note 218, at 7.
219. Id. at 12. (“[We] recognize that companies had little time to take the February 2010 SEC
guidance into account when preparing their 2009 Form 10-K reports. Accordingly, the review
presented here is as much a reflection of the state of climate change disclosure before the issuance
of the SEC guidelines as it is after.”).
220. See Form 10-K, supra note 35, at 1 (General Instructions A(2)). Deadlines for filing an
annual report on Form 10-K are sixty days after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report for
large accelerated filers, seventy-five days for accelerated filers, and ninety days for all other filers.
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registrants were already well along in preparing their Form 10-Ks for filing,
a point which, at least in this author’s experience, is generally not
conducive to last minute, unplanned disclosures. At the risk of generalizing,
it is doubtful the registrants included in ISS’s study had sufficient time to
digest the Interpretive Release in any way that would have led to a
quantifiable increase their climate risk disclosure. Second, and equally
problematic, ISS’s review did not compare the pre-Interpretive Release
disclosures of its sample registrants. As a result, it is difficult to assess with
any certainty whether these registrants’ post-Interpretive Release climate
change disclosures in fact increased in response to the Interpretive Release.
In January 2011, the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP published
the findings of its review of climate change disclosure in 2010 SEC
filings.221 Perhaps more anecdotal than empirical (Davis Polk did not reveal
the methodology or sampling for its review), the review uncovered what
might be regarded as a mixed bag:


An increase in generic weather risk factors;



New disclosures on potential changes in demand for products and
services and on increases in fuel prices;



Relatively little disclosure of actual or potential reputational harm
due to climate change; and



A minimal increase in climate change disclosure in the
Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section of
these SEC filings.

That said, registrants in greenhouse gas intensive industries, notably
energy companies, have enhanced their disclosure—including by adding

Id. Rule 12b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011), defines
a “large accelerated filer” as
an issuer after it first meets the following conditions as of the end of its fiscal year:
(i) the issuer had an aggregate worldwide market value of the voting and nonvoting common equity held by its non-affiliates of $700 million or more, as of the last
business day of the issuer’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter;
(ii) the issuer has been subject to the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Act for a period of at least twelve calendar months;
(iii) the issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Act; and (iv) the issuer is not eligible to use the requirements for smaller
reporting companies in Part 229 of this chapter for its annual and quarterly reports. . . .
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2.
221. See DAVID POLK & WARDWELL LLP, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS—
2011 UPDATE (2011) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS—2011
UPDATE], available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/eb800a1e-df86-43c6-9905012267585822/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/722ad6f8-0e42-4e5c-988e-088be83f9219/011
111_env_disclosure.pdf.
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more lengthy factual updates of legislative, regulatory and litigation
developments.222

The Davis Polk study concluded that the Interpretive Release “has not
had as significant an impact on [registrant’s] disclosure as some observers
initially expected.”223 Yet, like the ISS review, Davis Polk’s review is
encouraging in at least one respect: it also suggests that registrants most
obviously affected by the Interpretive Release—carbon-intensive sectors
like utilities and energy—are responding to the SEC’s guidance.
Nonetheless, the study acknowledges that such responses may be
attributable to other factors as well, such as electric utility settlements with
the New York State Attorney General.224
Davis Polk’s review was followed by the February 2011 publication by
Ceres, who conducted its own post-Interpretive Release review of registrant
climate change disclosures.225 For their review, Ceres, like ISS, assessed the
Form 10-K annual report filings of registrants “in a variety of industries”
that had filed their Form 10-K with the SEC in the first quarter of 2010.226
Thus, Ceres’ review suffers from the same defect as ISS, namely, that the
sample data is too close in time to the date the Interpretive Release was
issued. Also, Ceres’ review does not disclose the size or makeup of its
sample, though Ceres did indicate that registrants “were assessed for
possible inclusion . . . because of climate change’s impacts on a broad range
of industries” and that it “chose to emphasize large capitalization
[registrants], which tend to face a larger array of climate risk and
opportunity issues,” particularly electric power and utilities registrants.227
Still, Ceres rated registrant disclosures using the terms “poor,” “fair,”
“good,” and “excellent,” which Ceres admitted was a “subjective
assessment based on the authors’ evaluation of the SEC Guidance and our
assessment of reasonable investor expectations for high-quality
disclosure.”228
In view of this and Ceres’ well-documented stance on climate change
disclosure,229 it was not surprising that Ceres found that “improvements in
climate risk disclosure have been incremental at best.”230 According to
Ceres,
A review of SEC filings for the 2009 fiscal year, the most recent year for
which [Form] 10-Ks are available, reveals an array of climate change
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
See Coburn et al., supra note 19.
Id. at 5, 17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
See, e.g., id. at 11 n.9.
Id. at 2.
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reporting examples reflecting differing levels of comprehensiveness, detail
and clarity, and too many companies that fail to address the issues at all.
Our report includes examples of reporting that reflect good, fair and poor
disclosure. This report does not identify examples of exemplary disclosure
because such examples are wanting. The overall level of disclosure, while
improving, remains well below where it should be.231

Ceres further states, “For every company we found that had ‘poor’ or ‘fair’
disclosure—or no disclosure at all—dozens of similarly situated companies
provided similar reporting. We found that ‘good’ disclosure examples were
rare, and we found no instances of disclosure we believed should be rated
‘excellent.’”232
Ceres’ study did not confine its methodology and rating system strictly
to a review for responsiveness to the Interpretive Release. Ceres’ review
also “examine[d] investor statements on the reporting they require,
particularly the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure.”233 For
example, Ceres’ review also included registrant Form 10-Ks, disclosure of
greenhouse gas emissions, and “Strategic Analysis of Climate Risk and
Emissions Management.”234 Ceres did not disclose the extent to which these
“investor statements” and additional factors may have impacted its ratings.
In view of the somewhat limited post-Interpretive Release data on
climate change disclosure, this author reviewed the pre- and postInterpretive Release Form 10-K annual report filings of the following
thirty-six registrants in the most recently published Fortune 200.235
Table A: Registrants
Fortune
Rank
1
2
6
9

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Registrant
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
General Electric Co.
Bank of America Corp.

SIC236
5331, retail variety stores
2911, petroleum refining
3600, electronic and other electrical
equipment
6021, national commercial banks

Id. at 5 (citing the ISS review, which is described in Part V of this Article).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 10. See also supra text accompanying note 152.
See Coburn et al., supra note 19, at 6.
For the most recently available list of the Fortune 200, see Fortune 500, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
236. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is a U.S. government system that classifies
industries by a four digit code. Established in 1945, it is being supplanted by the six-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which was released in 1997. Certain
governmental departments and agencies, including the SEC, still use SIC codes. See Comparison
of SIC and NAICS Codes for the Plastics Industry, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.osha
.gov/SLTC/plastics/sic_naics_comparison.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
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Table A: Registrants
Fortune
Rank
10
11
16
17

Registrant
Ford Motor Co.

22

Hewlett Packard Co.
Verizon Communications, Inc.
American International Group.
Inc.
United Health Group Inc.

25
30

Kroger Co.
Home Depot Inc.

36
39
45

Boeing Co.
Archer Daniels Midland Corp.
Dow Chemical Co.

48
49
58

United Parcel Service Inc.
Kraft Foods Inc.
Caterpillar Inc.

68
70
88
94
105
111
116

Sunoco Inc.
Coca-Cola Co.
Delta Air Lines Inc.
Philip Morris International Inc.
International Paper Co.
McDonald’s Corp.
Motorola Solutions, Inc.

123

Alcoa Inc.

133

World Fuel Services Corp.

136
139
144
153
157

Freeport-McMoRan Copper &
Gold Inc.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Halliburton Co.
Union Pacific Corp.
Nucor Corp.

162

Dominion Resources Inc.

SIC236
3711, motor vehicle and passenger
bodies
3570, computer and office equipment
4813, telephone communications
6331, fire, marine and casualty
insurance
6324, hospital, and medical service
plans
5411, retail grocery stores
5211, retail lumber and other building
materials
3721, aircraft
2070, fats and oils
2821, plastics, materials, and
synthetic resins
4210, trucking and courier services
2000, food and kindred products
3531, construction machinery and
equipment
2911, petroleum refining
2080, beverages
4512, air transportation, scheduled
2111, cigarettes
2621, paper mills
5812, retail eating places
3663, radio, TV broadcasting
communications equipment
3350, rolling, drawing, and extruding
of nonferrous metals
5172, wholesale petroleum and
petroleum products
1000, metal mining
3011, tires and inner tubes
1389, oil, gas field services
4011, railroads, line haul operating
3312, steel works, blast furnaces, and
rolling mills
4911, electric services
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Table A: Registrants
Fortune
Rank
177
186
196
199

Registrant
PG&E Corp.
Cummins Inc.
Waste Management Inc.
Kellogg Co.

SIC236
4931, electric and other services,
combined
3510, engines and turbines
4953, refuse systems
2040, grain mill products

Registrants representing disparate industries and viewed as likely
candidates for climate change disclosure were chosen. These registrants’
Form 10-K annual reports covering fiscal years 2008 and 2010, which
would have been filed in the Spring immediately following the fiscal year
covered (i.e., Spring 2009 and Spring 2011), were reviewed. Like the ISS,
Ceres, and 2009 Doran and Quinn studies,237 these registrants’ annual
reports on Form 10-K were reviewed for certain keywords or phrases,
including: “climate change,” global warming,” “greenhouse gas,” “GHG,”
“carbon dioxide,” “CO2,” and “emission.” Each registrant’s disclosures in
its Form 10-K annual reports covering fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2010
were then compared.
The purpose of this review was to compare these registrants’ pre- and
post-Interpretive Release climate change disclosures. While this review
focused primarily on each registrant’s quantity of disclosure, quality of
disclosure was considered when assessing registrant responsiveness to the
four topics the SEC suggested registrants consider in connection with
climate change disclosure. In general, a trend of increased climate change
disclosures among these registrants, and in turn a trend of increased
responsiveness to the Interpretive Release, was observed.
Of the thirty-six registrants, the nineteen registrants listed in Table B
below included some measure of climate change disclosure in both their
pre- and post-Interpretive Release Form 10-K annual reports.238

237. See supra Parts III, V.
238. Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure in Both Pre and Post-Interpretive Release
Form 10-K Annual Reports (Aug. 2011) (unpublished analysis) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Hansen Analysis].
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Table B: Registrants with Both Pre- and Post-Interpretive Release Disclosure
Fortune
2008 Annual Report
2010 Annual Report
Registrant
239
Rank
on Form 10-K
on Form 10-K240
2
Exxon Mobil Corp.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors; Item
7, MD&A
10
Ford Motor Co.
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors; Item
1A, Risk Factors; Item
3, Legal Proceedings;
3, Legal Proceedings;
Item 7, MD&A
Item 7, MD&A
11
Hewlett Packard Co. Item 1, Business
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors; Note
18 to Financial
Statements
30
Home Depot Inc.
Item 1, Business
Item 1, Business
45
Dow Chemical Co.
Item 7, MD&A
Item 7, MD&A
48
United Parcel
Item 1, Business
Item 1, Business; Item
Service Inc.
1A Risk Factors
68
Sunoco Inc.
Item 1A, Risk Factors;
Item 1A, Risk Factors;
Item 7, MD&A
Item 7, MD&A
70
Coca-Cola Co.
Item 1A, Risk Factors;
Item 1A, Risk Factors,
Note 1 to Financial
Note 1 to Financial
Statements
Statements
88
Delta Air Lines Inc.
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors
1A, Risk Factors
105
111

International Paper
Co.
McDonald’s Corp.

Item 1A, Risk Factors;
Item 7, MD&A
Item 1, Business;

Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors

239. The SEC’s Annual Report Form 10-K prescribes the following disclosures: For Item 1,
Business registrants are required to “furnish the information required by Item 101 of Regulation
S-K [Description of Business]. . . .” Form 10-K, supra note 35, at 8 (citation omitted). For Item
1A, Risk Factors, registrants are required to “[s]et forth, under the caption ‘Risk Factors,’ where
appropriate, the risk factors described in Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K [Prospectus Summary,
Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges]. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). For Item 3,
Legal Proceedings, registrants are required to “furnish the information required by Item 103 of
Regulation S-K [Legal Proceedings]. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). For Item 7, Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, registrants are required
to “[f]urnish the information required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K [Management’s Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations]. . . .” Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
Disclosure provided in a registrant’s notes to financial statements would have been provided in
connection with Item 8, Financial Statements and Supplementary Data, which requires registrants
to “(a) furnish financial statements meeting the requirements of Regulation S-X.” Id. (citation
omitted).
240. Id.
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Table B: Registrants with Both Pre- and Post-Interpretive Release Disclosure
Fortune
2008 Annual Report
2010 Annual Report
Registrant
239
Rank
on Form 10-K
on Form 10-K240
123
Alcoa Inc.
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors
1A, Risk Factors
136
Freeport-McMoRan
Item 1A, Risk Factors
Item 1A, Risk Factors
153
Union Pacific Corp.
Item 1A, Risk Factors;
Item 1A, Risk Factors,
Item 7, MD&A
Item 7, MD&A
157
Nucor Corp.
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1A, Risk Factors
1A, Risk Factors
162
Dominion Resources Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
Inc.
1A, Risk Factors; Note
1A, Risk Factors; Note
7a to Financial
23 to Financial
Statements
Statements
177
PG&E Corp.
Item 1, Business
Item 1, Business
186
Cummins Inc.
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
1A, Risk Factors
1A, Risk Factors
196
Waste Management
Item 1, Business; Item
Item 1, Business; Item
Inc.
1A, Risk Factors
1A, Risk Factors

Of these registrants, those that increased their climate change
disclosure, even if only modestly, were Exxon, Ford, Hewlett-Packard,
Home Depot, Dow Chemical, UPS, Sunoco, Delta, Freeport-McMoRan,
Dominion, PG&E, and Cummins. Increased disclosure was most often
found in Items 1 (Business) and 1A (Risk Factors).241
The nine registrants listed in Table C below did not include climate
change disclosure in their pre-Interpretive Release Form 10-K annual
report, but did include some measure of climate change disclosure in their
post-Interpretive Release Form 10-K annual report.242
Table C: Registrants without Pre-Interpretive Release Disclosure
but Having Post-Interpretive Release Disclosure
Fortune
2010 Annual Report on
Registrant
Rank
Form 10-K243
1
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
17
American International Group. Inc. Item 1, Business
39
Archer Daniels Midland Corp.
Item 1, Business; Item 1A, Risk
Factors
58
Caterpillar Inc.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
94
Philip Morris International Inc.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
241. Hansen Analysis, supra note 238.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Table C: Registrants without Pre-Interpretive Release Disclosure
but Having Post-Interpretive Release Disclosure
Fortune
2010 Annual Report on
Registrant
Rank
Form 10-K243
133
World Fuel Services Corp.
Item 1, Business; Item 1A, Risk
Factors
139
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
144
Halliburton Co.
Item 1A, Risk Factors
199
Kellogg Co.
Item 1, Business; Item 1A Risk
Factors

In general, at least in terms of the space devoted to climate change, the
new disclosures made by these registrants are best described as minimal.
Additionally, eight registrants did not include climate change disclosure in
either their pre- or post-Interpretive Release Form 10-K annual report:
General Electric, Bank of America, Verizon, Kroger, United Health,
Boeing, Kraft, and Motorola.244
Of the twenty-eight registrants whose post-Interpretive Release Form
10-K annual report included some measure of climate change disclosure,
the disclosures were reviewed specifically for apparent consideration of one
or more of the four topics the SEC suggested registrants consider: the
impact of climate change legislation and regulation, the impact of
international climate change accords, the indirect consequences of climate
change regulation on business trends, and the physical impacts of climate
change.245 The following registrants appeared to have taken into account at
least one or more of the four topics suggested by the SEC.246
Table D: Registrant Post-Interpretive Release Climate Change Disclosures
Indirect
Impact of
Impact
Consequences
Fortune
Legislation
Physical
Registrant
of Int’l
of Regulation
Rank
and
Impacts
Accords
on Business
Regulation
Trends
1
Wal-Mart
●
Stores Inc.
2
Exxon Mobil
●
●
●
Corp.
10
Ford Motor Co.
●
●
11
Hewlett
●
●
●
Packard Co.
244. Id.
245. See Interpretive Release, supra note 1.
246. Hansen Analysis, supra note 238.

532

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

Table D: Registrant Post-Interpretive Release Climate Change Disclosures
Indirect
Impact of
Impact
Consequences
Fortune
Legislation
Physical
Registrant
of Int’l
of Regulation
Rank
and
Impacts
Accords
on Business
Regulation
Trends
17
American
●
●
International
Group. Inc.
30
Home Depot
●
Inc.
39
Archer Daniels
●
●
Midland Corp.
45
Dow Chemical
●
●
Co.
48
United Parcel
●
●
Service Inc.
58
Caterpillar Inc.
●
68
Sunoco Inc.
●
●
70
Coca-Cola Co.
●
●
88
Delta Air Lines
●
●
●
Inc.
94
Philip Morris
●
International
Inc.
105
International
●
●
●
Paper Co.
111
McDonald’s
●
Corp.
123
Alcoa Inc.
●
●
●
●
133
World Fuel
●
●
Services Corp.
136
Freeport●
●
●
McMoRan
Copper & Gold
Inc.
139
Goodyear Tire
●
& Rubber Co.
144
Halliburton Co.
●
153
Union Pacific
●
●
Corp.
157
Nucor Corp.
●
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Table D: Registrant Post-Interpretive Release Climate Change Disclosures
Indirect
Impact of
Impact
Consequences
Fortune
Legislation
Physical
Registrant
of Int’l
of Regulation
Rank
and
Impacts
Accords
on Business
Regulation
Trends
162
Dominion
●
●
●
●
Resources Inc.
177
PG&E Corp.
●
●
●
186
Cummins Inc.
●
●
196
Waste
●
Management
Inc.
199
Kellogg Co.
●

On the basis of this review, as illustrated in the foregoing tables, and as
mentioned above, the data showed a trend of increased climate change
disclosures among these registrants. To be sure, for some registrants, the
increased disclosure was modest. Still, most registrants who included
climate change disclosure in their post-Interpretive Release Form 10-Ks
attempted to address multiple topics suggested by the SEC. Although
quantification of precise climate risks was largely absent, several
registrants, including Ford, Home Depot, Dominion, PG&E, and Cummins,
devoted space to climate change disclosures that do not necessarily fit under
the categories suggested by the SEC, such as disclosure relating to
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation efforts. Also of note, Freeport
McMoran, Dominion, and PG&E reported on their past greenhouse gas
emissions as part of their disclosure. Otherwise, few if any of the registrants
studied here disclosed greenhouse gas emissions levels or targets. It is
important, however, to observe that those registrants most affected by the
Interpretive Release, specifically those in carbon intensive industries,
increased their climate change disclosure in their Form 10-K annual reports.
Accordingly, these results suggest, even if somewhat modestly, a trend
towards an increase in and maturation of disclosure, especially as
registrants become more comfortable with the topic of climate change and
the Interpretive Release.
Of course, overreliance on any of these pre- and post-Interpretive
Release studies, including this author’s, should be cautioned against
because they presume the materiality of climate change for all registrants.
Put another way, they erroneously equate disclosure with compliance, or,
more pointedly, nondisclosure with noncompliance. These studies tend to
assume that registrants who may not include climate change disclosure in
their SEC filings (or who may not be disclosing as much as some parties
might like) are simply ignoring their disclosure obligations and the
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Interpretive Release—“systematic avoidance” as one author put it.247 But
such assumptions reflect a misunderstanding of not only the particular rules
governing disclosure in this area and the Interpretive Release, but also the
process of disclosure.
Climate change disclosure is, to a large degree, predicated upon
judgments of materiality and an understanding of the particular facts and
circumstances of the particular registrant. It may very well be that a
registrant undertook the analysis prescribed by the rules and the Interpretive
Release, but nonetheless determined that disclosure in an SEC filing was
not appropriate at that time. This highlights another fact about climate
change disclosure specifically, and registrant disclosure generally: the
process of deciding whether and what to disclose is not transparent, nor is it
meant to be, especially in the context of failing to disclose.248 If registrants
were required to disclose the processes they undertook for deciding not to
disclose something, one of the central purposes of the disclosure rules
would be undermined: separating important information “from less
important information that would be extraneous or irrelevant to
investors.”249 At a very basic level, what matters most is disclosure or the
absence of disclosure; investors can draw their own conclusions from
there.250
VI. CONSIDERING REASONS FOR THE (ASSUMED) “LACK OF”
REGISTRANT CLIMATE DISCLOSURE
Let us assume for present purposes that despite the Interpretive Release
registrant climate change disclosure is lacking. What might explain this?
Are there plausible reasons? Should we expect this trend to continue? There
247. Camden D. Burton, Note, An Inconvenient Risk: Climate Change Disclosure and the
Burden on Corporations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1287, 1296 (2010) (“Although it has been argued
that the lack of detailed oversight and review by the SEC has led to a stronger impression of
omission of potential risks or opportunities, the disparity between predicted impacts on companies
due to the effect of climate change and the lack of discussion in, for example, MD&As indicates a
systemic avoidance of climate change risk disclosure.” (footnotes omitted)).
248. See Gail Henderson, The Materiality of Climate Change and the Role of Voluntary
Disclosure (COMP. RESEARCH IN LAW & POL. ECON, Research Paper No. 47, 2009) (“Even if
issuers are meeting their current obligations with respect to disclosure of climate change risks,
however, the ‘materiality’ threshold for disclosure would likely leave a gap between what issuers
are required to disclose under the law and what some investors would like to know about how
issuers are responding to the challenges posed by climate change. This is due to the fact that if an
issuer has determined that climate change will not have a material impact on its financial results, it
is under no obligation to disclose its reasons for reaching this conclusion.”).
249. Miller, supra note 84, at 368.
250. Registrants are required in their annual and periodic reports to affirm the adequacy of their
disclosure controls and procedures. See Form 10-K, supra note 35; Form 10-Q, supra note 35
(requiring disclosure required by Item 307 (“Disclosure Controls and Procedures”) of Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.307 (2011)). A registrant’s principal executive officer and principal financial
officer are also required to certify the adequacy of these disclosure controls and procedures, which
are filed with the foregoing reports. See Form 10-K, supra note 35; Form 10-Q, supra note 35.

2012]

Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants

535

are a number of reasons that might be advanced, some more plausible (and
palatable) than others, such as: inadequate, incomplete, or speculative
disclosure may lead to liability under the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities law; climate change has not reached the level of materiality
required for disclosure by many registrants; some registrants lack the
expertise and resources to adequately evaluate climate change; and the SEC
has not made this issue a priority right now (so why should registrants).
The latter reason is premised upon the notion that until the SEC makes
climate change a priority by following through on its promised “next steps”
in the Interpretive Release or via its comment letter process, registrants will
be slow to increase their climate change disclosure. As discussed in Part IV,
the Interpretive Release indicated that the SEC would hold a public climate
change disclosure roundtable, solicit further guidance from its then-existing
Investor Advisory Committee, and monitor disclosure as part of its
disclosure review program.251 The first two of these initiatives never
materialized. In fact, the Investor Advisory Committee was since disbanded
and only recently did the SEC organize a replacement.252 To date, the SEC
has issued climate change disclosure comments to only a handful of
registrants. Davis Polk, as part of its review of SEC filings made in 2011,
“identified only six climate change disclosure comments issued”253 to
registrants in a “variety of industries ranging from manufacturing and
energy, to less environmentally intensive industries, including insurance
and even a beauty salon operation.”254 In addition, they noted that none of
these registrants were what you might call “the usual suspects.” These
findings prompted at least one writer to ask: “Does the SEC care if you’re
green?”255
To be fair, the SEC’s apparent lack of follow-up to the Interpretive
Release does not necessarily reflect a lack of SEC interest in climate change
disclosure. Rather, it is quite likely that the SEC has been distracted by the
extraordinary burdens imposed upon it as a result of the recent financial
crisis and related legislation, specifically the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act). The
financial crisis and the subsequent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act drowned
out the amount of interest in the Interpretive Release.256 Furthermore,
251. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,297.
252. See supra Part IV. Section 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the creation of a new
Investor Advisory Committee, but the SEC has not yet done so. See Implementing the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight
/dodd-frank/dates_to_be_determined.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
253. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS—2011 UPDATE, supra note 221, at 3.
254. Id.
255. Sarah Johnson, Does the SEC Care if You’re Green?, CFO.COM (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14550880.
256. See generally SELLERS ET AL., supra note 158 (“In hindsight, climate change disclosure
became a classic hurry up and wait game. While the SEC suggested in the release that it planned

536

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

criticism by some members of Congress and “Congress’ diminished interest
in adopting federal greenhouse gas reduction legislation”257 were also likely
responsible for any diminished interest in the Interpretive Release. As a
result, a danger arises that some registrants have taken the position that
unless they get a comment from the SEC, they are not going to change their
disclosure practices. By any measure, however, lack of SEC focus is not a
valid justification for lack of disclosure, as it obviously ignores the serious
analysis required by SEC rules and the Interpretive Release.
The arguable lack of climate change disclosure might also be ascribed
to a lack of registrant experience or expertise with the science of climate
change. Admittedly, this may not hold true for registrants in the electric,
coal, oil and gas, transportation, insurance, and related sectors that have a
much more direct interest in the climate change debate and have therefore
presumably dedicated more resources to investigating the issue. Still, for
many registrants outside of these sectors, devoting the necessary
resources—personnel, time, and money—to climate change analysis vis-àvis their own operations, is a daunting task. The necessary “scope of the
evaluation of climate change risk within an organization may be enormous,
depending on the nature of the business,” and such an investigation may
entail significant costs.258 Furthermore, it does not help that registrants are
essentially left to their own devices in determining whose or which science
of climate change is correct and thus worth following. On this score, the
Interpretive Release has been justly criticized for “cit[ing] an odd grab bag
of sources in describing the technical foundations for climate change
understanding and regulation” and offering “no suggestions about which
to hold a public roundtable on disclosure regarding climate change matters in the spring of 2010,
and would ‘determine whether further guidance or rulemaking relating to climate change
disclosure is necessary or appropriate,’ these plans were quickly eclipsed by financial services
reform legislation, continuing issues in the financial markets’ performance, and, presumably, by
the unavoidable conclusion that new energy legislation was not going to become a reality in the
current Congress.”).
257. See ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS—2011 UPDATE, supra note 221, at 1,
5.
258. McFarland, supra note 113, at 295; see also Burton, supra note 247, at 1303–04.
These [legislative and regulatory] efforts can be tracked and potential implications can
be predicated, but that type of analysis requires a dedicated resource and knowledge of
the regulatory schemes in all geographic regions in which the company has operations,
suppliers, or clients. That is a substantially larger burden than one subject matter expert
could reasonably be expected to be familiar with and may require additional resources
to hire outside consultants for regulatory or legislative risk analysis
....
. . . Measuring and addressing risks, and possibly even determining the opportunities of
climate change will require a substantial commitment to research and development.
Burton, supra note 247, at 1303–04. Burton’s thesis is, however, that “[t]he burden on
management is simply not more important than providing complete information to investors.” Id.
at 1304.
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information [registrants] should consider reliable, nor . . . any guidance on
the treatment of uncertainty by climate change experts.”259
Nevertheless, the analysis required by the SEC’s rules and Interpretive
Release must be done, and by all registrants. As a result, perhaps a more
plausible reason for the arguable lack of disclosure is the fact that for many
registrants, climate change has simply not, in their estimation, reached the
level of materiality required for disclosure. This fact has been conceded by
even the staunchest supporters of increased disclosure.260 This is a reflection
of the pairing of the inherently difficult materiality analysis and the science
of climate change (something with which most registrants have little
expertise). Recall, as discussed in Part III above, that the concept of
materiality is often critical to a registrant’s analysis and obligation to
disclose, and such determinations are rarely as straightforward and clear cut
as might be supposed. Nowhere is this more evident than in the context of
MD&A disclosure required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which as
discussed previously, generally requires that registrants disclose “known
trends, events or uncertainties” that may have a material effect on the
registrant’s financial condition.261
Even conceding that there may be a general consensus as to the science
of climate change, there is significant uncertainty as to the degree, scope,
and timing of its forecasted effects and any accompanying legislative or
regulatory responses. This uncertainty will necessarily influence a
registrant’s materiality analysis and the extent of its disclosure. As one
writer has observed, “even those companies that have evaluated the risk
may not fully appreciate its significance, or may have a distorted view of
the risk.”262 Of the ways identified by the SEC that climate change might
trigger disclosure, the most obvious are physical risks and legislative and
regulatory risks. Right now, it is virtually impossible to predict what form
of federal climate change legislation or regulation is likely to be enacted.263
259. BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 209, at 3.
260. See Coburn et al., supra note 19, at 13 (“The SEC Guidance applies to all publicly traded
companies required to file financial reports with the SEC. Therefore, [registrants] of all sizes in all
industries need to assess their climate risks and opportunities and disclose any material issues in
their filings. But, this does not necessarily mean that every company will find material climate
issues to disclose. . . . [A registrant] can only answer this question by undertaking a systemic
materiality analysis.”); see also Joo, supra note 103, at 691 (arguing that “for most corporations
[climate change does not yet have] company-specific immediate effect of the type that might
qualify as ‘material’”) (alteration in original). Joo does concede that this is not the case for some
industries, such as the insurance industry. Id.
261. Exchange Act Release No. 6835, supra note 22, at 4.
262. McFarland, supra note 113, at 296 (arguing also that “[i]f the current corporate norm is
averse to disclosing climate change risk, it may obscure the true nature of that risk”).
263. See, e.g., Stefanie Lepore, Outlook for Greenhouse Gas Legislation in the 112th Congress,
V&E Climate Change Rep., Feb. 21, 2011, at 21, available at http://www.velaw.com/resources
/VinsonElkinsClimateChangeReportIssue14.aspx (“The 112th Congress will not preempt
regulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) by adopting legislation to displace it; rather, any actions it
takes regarding GHGs will be aimed at preventing, not preempting, regulation by the United

538

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

Although Congress has considered numerous pieces of climate change
legislation, the uncertainty of action undermines any argument that coming
federal legislation is a “known trend.”264 Even implementation of
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) is being
slowed, casting doubt on at least the timing of its proposed greenhouse gas
reductions programs.265 Additionally, it is still uncertain when the predicted
physical effects of climate change will occur. One writer has observed,
“The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
[winner—along with Al Gore—of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007] is
considered the authoritative voice on climate change.”266 Although the
IPCC’s 2007 Synthesis Report states that evidence that the climate is
warming is now “unequivocal,”267 the effects of global warming are less
clear. For instance, over the course of the twenty-first century, the “IPCC
has expressed ‘very high confidence’ of increased risk of flood due to the
rise in sea level, but only ‘medium confidence’ that global warming will
affect crop productivity.”268
The uncertainty with respect to the physical impacts of climate change,
and their timing in particular, may make it difficult for [registrants] to
determine whether they will have a “material” effect on financial results in
the future. “Would a ‘reasonable investor’ consider physical risks 50-100
years in the future ‘material’ today?” Even assuming a long-term investor,

States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the existing Clean Air Act. The American
Power Act, sponsored by Senators Kerry and Lieberman, could not survive even the
Democratically controlled 111th Congress. It is difficult to foresee how a bill addressing climate
change broadly or greenhouse gas regulation could ever reach the House floor for debate under the
current leadership. Similarly, with the divided Congress, it is unlikely that Senate Democrats will
expend resources and political capital attempting another comprehensive bill regulating
greenhouse gases.”); W. Brinkley Dickerson, Jr. & David I. Meyers, Note to SEC: “Reasonably
Likely to Be Enacted”? You Have Got to be Kidding!, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP (Mar. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.troutmansanders.com/note-to-sec-reasonably-likely-to-be-enacted-you
-have-got-to-be-kidding-03-03-2010/ (noting the “fool’s errand of tying a public company’s
disclosure obligations, and hence its exposure to litigation risk, to an assessment of whether
regulation or legislation will be enacted”).
264. See e.g., Joo, supra note 103, 688–89 (“While science is making it increasingly clear that
greenhouse-gas emissions are environmentally destructive, and there is a possibility of future
regulation, there are as yet no ‘reasonably likely’ material consequences for that destruction (such
as tort liability or regulatory fines) that would [in the context of a registrant’s MD&A disclosure
obligations] materially affect liquidity, revenues, or costs.”); see also ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCLOSURE, supra note 139, at 20–21 (noting the view of “officials at the SEC’s Division of
Corporation Finance” in 2004 that “disclosures about the impact of potential greenhouse gas
controls are not necessarily required at this time . . . because controls do not appear imminent at
the federal level through ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or [other] legislation”).
265. See, e.g., Despite Litigation Roadblock, California Pushes Ahead with Cap and Trade
Implementation, LATHAM & WATKINS CLIENT ALERT, Apr. 26, 2011, available at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4139_1.pdf.
266. Henderson, supra note 248, at 11–12.
267. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15.
268. Henderson, supra note 248, at 11–12.
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these impacts may be too remote in time to affect a decision made today to
buy, sell or hold a security.269

Moreover, uncertainty is not merely a problem for registrants.
Investors, particularly large institutional investors, also struggle with the
uncertainties of climate change, for example, when constructing models to
account for the effects of climate change on their investment portfolios. The
following commentary, which appeared in a report considering the
implications of climate change for strategic asset allocation prepared by
Mercer LLC in 2011, illustrates the problem:
Uncertainty is a key stumbling block in climate change research. Every
link in the chain of manmade greenhouse gas emissions, physical changes
in the climate system and their socioeconomic impacts is highly uncertain.
Therefore, investors cannot simply rely on a best guess as to how the
future will unfold when planning their investments. Moreover, because
many of these uncertainties emanate from complex systems that are poorly
understood and difficult to model, climate change has been called a
problem of “deep uncertainty.”
In this context, deep uncertainty implies that probabilities cannot be
assigned to future states with high confidence. This calls into question the
appropriateness of relying too heavily on quantitative modeling tools, for
which investors must specify probability distributions to underpin the
parameters of their investment models.
Institutional investors must develop new tools to more effectively model
systemic risks such as climate change. These tools require an expansion of
the way we think about portfolio risk, looking beyond mere volatility.
Describing probable scenarios, identifying the potential sources of risks,
and measuring and monitoring them over time are the components of an
improved risk management strategy that seeks to protect the long-term
270
assets that institutional investors oversee on behalf of their stakeholders.

269. See id. at 11 (citations omitted). See also, Deatherage, supra note 172, at 38–39 (“One of
the challenges for registered companies that are now subject to the SEC’s guidance on climate risk
is that the ability to predict an actual physical effect, and then to quantify the direct and indirect
financial and market risks. Numeric calculations would in most cases be inherently speculative.
Companies may find it difficult to state with any certainty whether these events will occur, and if
they do, what the impact to the registrant might be.”); Paredes, supra note 206 (“The prospect that
this guidance will in fact foster confusion and uncertainty about a company’s required disclosures
troubles me. What triggers a ‘reputational damage’ or ‘physical effects’ disclosure is far from
certain, as is the scope of any such disclosure if and when required. More to the point, reputational
damage and the impact on a company of the physical effects of climate change can be quite
speculative. There is a notable risk that the interpretive release will encourage disclosures that are
unlikely to improve investor decision making and may actually distract investors from focusing on
more important information.”). See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) (exploring
disclosure obligations and the concept of information overload and its effects on investors).
270. CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS—IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION,
MERCER LLC 4 (2011) (citations omitted), available at http://www.mercer.com/articles/1406410.
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Given these uncertainties, and keeping in mind that materiality analysis
is specific to the facts and circumstances of a particular registrant, many
registrants may conclude that, at present, climate change is not reasonably
likely to have a material effect on their financial condition or results of
operations.
Closely related to the matter of deciding whether to disclose, and if so,
how much to disclose, is the omnipresent specter of liability or even the
allegation of liability for fraud under federal securities law. It is this
potential liability that might also help explain the arguable paucity of
climate change disclosure. To entirely ignore or “[t]o overstate or speculate
[about the effects climate change] may have an adverse effect on prices for
[a registrant’s] stock, which in turn could adversely affect shareholders.”271
This is often the brew from which the bitter drink of securities litigation
springs. The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws prohibit
misstatements and omissions of material facts that have the effect of
defrauding investors and the securities markets. The most well-known and
well-used anti-fraud provision is Rule 10b-5 promulgated under § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person to
“employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive devise or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”272 SEC
Rule 10b-5 implements this provision by making it unlawful to, among
other things, “make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”273 While
the elements of a claim differ in some respects depending upon whether an
action for fraud is brought by the government or a private litigant, the
essential elements are the same: a misrepresentation or omission, of a
material fact, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, made
with scienter.274 Of course, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “do not create an
271.
272.
273.
274.

Deatherage, supra note 172, at 39.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012).
See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). In Broudo, the Court set
forth the basic elements of a private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission)[;] (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of
mind[;] (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security[;] (4) reliance, often
referred to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as
“‘transaction causation,’”[;] (5) economic loss[;] (6) “‘loss causation,’” i.e., a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss . . . .
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also SEC v. Rana Research, Inc. 8 F.3d 1358, 1363
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that in an SEC cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC is
not required to show reliance, economic loss, or loss causation). The U.S. Supreme Court has
implied a private right of action from the text and purpose of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See
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affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information.”275
Additionally, “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under
Rule 10b-5.”276 Nevertheless, once a registrant undertakes to speak or
speaks in response to a statutory or regulatory command, it must speak “the
full truth.”277
A fair treatment of the potential for liability under federal securities
laws for misstatements or omissions of material facts relating to the effects
of climate change on a registrant’s business is beyond the scope of this
Article. Still, it is worth noting that courts disagree about whether a
misleading disclosure in response to, or a failure to disclose pursuant to,
Regulation S-X or S-K—particularly Item 303, the MD&A—may form a
sufficient basis for a cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.278
Commentators have cast doubt on whether liability under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 might arise in connection with failure to disclose the effects of
climate change on a registrant’s business.279 Even so, for many registrants,
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter for a private action); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (recognizing a private action, but requiring that the
plaintiff be a purchaser or seller).
275. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011).
276. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
277. First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977) (Rule 10b-5 creates a
statutory duty to “speak the full truth [arises] when a defendant undertakes to say anything”).
278. Compare In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing
district court’s dismissal of Rule 10b-5 claim based on defendant’s failure to make disclosures on
known trends that were reasonably likely to have a material impact on revenue, based upon a
requirement under Regulation S-K, Item 303), with Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir.
2000) (“[A] violation of SK-303’s reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a
material omission under Rule 10b-5.”); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1993) (declining to reach issue of whether violations of Regulation S-K Item 303 create an
independent cause of action for private plaintiffs under 10(b)); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund. v.
Adecco S.A., 434 F. Supp. 2d 815, 828 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“[D]emonstration of a violation of the
disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure
would be required under Rule 10b-5.” (quoting Alfus v. Pyramind Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598,
608 (N.D. Cal. 1991))); In re Corning, Inc. Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698, 715–17 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (rejecting argument that Regulation S-K Item 303 does not impose any duty under Rule
10b-5, but rather that the “[c]ourt must consider Item 303 in connection with plaintiff’s claim”
under 10b-5); In re Campbell Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 590–91 (D.N.J. 2001)
(violation of Regulation S-K does not necessarily violate § 10(b)).
279. See, e.g., Joo, supra note 103, at 690 (footnotes omitted).
[I]t is unlikely that existing securities fraud law provides a cause of action against a
corporation for failure to disclose information about its carbon impact. As noted above,
disclosure about a corporation’s carbon impact is unlikely to be required, and thus the
materiality of an omission will be a moot point. Materiality would only be relevant if a
corporation were to make an affirmative misrepresentation or were to fail to correct
earlier statements that later became misleading. While carbon-impact information might
be important to the buying and selling decisions of some, even many, environmentally
concerned individuals, the legal standard is that of an objective “‘reasonable
shareholder,’” who is presumed to invest in order to make money. Even in such a
situation, the omissions or misstatements would have to be made in connection with a
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it is not necessarily the prospect of liability so much as the prospect of
merely having to defend against a claim of liability that informs the
calculus of disclosure. Securities litigation is exceedingly expensive and
resource intensive, regardless of whether it results in a determination of
liability. Registrants have learned over time that disclosure and the goal of
avoiding such litigation go hand in hand. Thus, “[c]are must be taken in
deciding what [if anything] to disclose—too little disclosure may not
provide a full picture to investors; too much disclosure, particularly of an
overly speculative nature, may not provide them with realistic
information.”280
VII. LOOKING FORWARD: POSSIBLE TRENDS THAT MAY
INCREASE REGISTRANT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
Undoubtedly, for proponents of enhanced climate change disclosure in
SEC filings, the reasons for the arguable lack of disclosure are unsatisfying.
Yet, these and other reasons for nondisclosure are somewhat transitory and
will become less important over time for a number of reasons. First, as
registrants become more certain of the science and forecast effects of
climate change, as well as its regulation, disclosure in SEC filings will
likely mature and increase. An evolution of registrant certainty will in time
enable registrants to more thoroughly and accurately assess the potentially
material effects of climate change as prescribed by SEC rules and the
Interpretive Release, and may well lead to increased disclosure. This is, of
course, subject to the caveat that registrants determine whether such effects
are indeed material and, thus, warrant disclosure. But even though the
prospects for comprehensive federal climate change legislation and
regulation may be rather dim at the present, this issue is clearly not going to
go away.281 Moreover, as long as a lack of comprehensive federal
legislation and regulation exists, individual states and other jurisdictions
will continue to be actively engaged with these issues. As a consequence of
such engagement, climate change regulation may in fact become more
numerous and complex, prompting registrants to engage in additional
analysis and disclosure.
purchase or sale of securities, and only a person who actually bought or sold securities
in reliance could bring suit.
Id.; Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things
Heating Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 314 (2008) (concluding that the pleading
and proof requirements of Rule 10b-5 make it unlikely that liability could be imposed at present
on the basis of a misstatement or omission of material fact with regard to climate change).
280. Deatherage, supra note 172, at 35; see also W. Brinkley Dickerson, Jr. et al., SEC
Publishes Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Requirements Relating to Climate Change,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.troutmansanders.com/sec-publishes-inter
pretive-guidance-on-disclosure-requirements-relating-to-climate-change-02-05-2010/
(arguing
that the Interpretive Release requires registrants to engage in speculative disclosures).
281. See Lepore, supra note 263, at 21–22.
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Second, climate change disclosure in SEC filings will likely mature and
increase as the paths of voluntary and “mandatory” (i.e., SEC prescribed)
continue to merge. Registrants who have historically voluntarily disclosed
information about climate change’s contributions to and effects on their
businesses, now have, in light of the Interpretive Release, an even greater
interest in ensuring that their voluntary and mandatory disclosures are not
inconsistent. As discussed in Part IV above, voluntary disclosures,
previously regarded as outside the realm of SEC filings, may now merit a
second look to determine compliance with existing disclosure requirements.
As pressure for registrants to engage in voluntary disclosure continues to
grow, pressure will also grow for similar disclosure in SEC filings. This
does not mean, however, that voluntary and mandatory disclosures will be
one and the same. As has thoughtfully been observed by even advocates of
increased disclosure,
[T]his does not mean that voluntary and mandatory disclosures will be
identical in content or scope; voluntary disclosures are often more
extensive, as they include information that does not necessarily meet SEC
materiality standards. However, mandatory disclosures should be factually
and conceptually consistent regarding the impact of climate-related risks
and opportunities and the [registrant’s] business strategy for addressing
those issues.282

Third, climate change disclosure will likely mature and increase as the
lines between SEC and other regulatory agencies’ mandated disclosures
continue to blur. Consider the potential intersection of certain registrants’
greenhouse gas emissions reporting obligations pursuant to the EPA’s
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule (the Reporting Rules),283
and the SEC’s guidance. Under the EPA’s Reporting Rules, suppliers of
fossil fuels, manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and any facilities that
emit 25,000 metric tons or more per year of greenhouse gases must submit
annual reports of their emissions to the EPA,284 which the EPA will make
publicly available on the Internet. In discussing a registrant’s assessment of
282. Coburn et al., supra note 19, at 10.
283. 40 C.F.R. § 86 (2009); see also Climate Change – Regulatory Initiatives, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). The
Reporting Rules were published in final form in December 2009 and took effect on December 29,
2009. Around the same time, the EPA announced two proposals to regulate and reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases: the so-called “tailoring rule,” which would require facilities emitting over
25,000 tons of greenhouse gases per year to obtain permits to do so in the future; and new
emissions standards for light-duty vehicles. The EPA issued the final tailoring rule on May 13,
2010 and the final emissions standards for light-duty vehicles on April 1, 2010. Additional EPA
regulatory initiatives are pending. Id.
284. For the EPA’s Reporting Rules, see Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/notices.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). The EPA
estimated that the threshold of 25,000 metric tons would cover about 85 percent of the U.S.’s
greenhouse gas emissions and apply to approximately 10,000 facilities. Id. SOC. INV. FORUM
FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010).
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the materiality of climate change legislation and regulation, the SEC
pointedly reminded registrants that “management should ensure that it has
sufficient information regarding the registrant’s greenhouse gas emissions
and other operational matters to evaluate the likelihood of a material effect
arising from the subject legislation or regulation.”285 Although the SEC
might view a registrant’s actual greenhouse gas emissions only as a relevant
data point in the broader context of making a materiality assessment of
climate change disclosure, it is worth noting that the disclosure of such
information elsewhere (e.g., as part of the EPA’s Reporting Rules) will
perhaps only increase pressure on registrants to include similar disclosure in
their SEC filings.286
Fourth, climate change disclosure will likely mature and increase as
large institutional shareholders and other activists continue to exert pressure
on registrants to enhance their voluntary and mandatory climate change
disclosures.287 Many large institutional investors “have developed socially
responsible investing groups and protocols, and utilized the power of the
media and the Internet to launch public campaigns to attempt to convince
[registrants] to disclose their activities that affect the environment.”288
Research recently published by Julie Cotter and Muftah M. Najah of the
Australian Centre for Sustainable Business Development at the University
of Southern Queensland has found a “highly significant relationship
between institutional investor influence and climate change disclosure” by
companies in the Global 500 through responses to the annual Climate
Disclosure Project questionnaire and “via primary corporate communication

285. Interpretive Release, supra note 1, at 6,296 n.71. The SEC’s discussion on this point refers
to another note in the Interpretive Release that discusses the registrant’s principal executive and
financial officers’ required certifications regarding the maintenance of the registrant’s disclosure
controls and procedures. Deatherage observes that
[t]hus, it appears that the gathering of [greenhouse gas] emissions data falls within the
scope of these rules for purposes of evaluating the need to make disclosures relating to
the effectiveness of climate risk disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that the
information is collected, evaluated, and disclosed on a timely basis.
Deatherage, supra note 172, at 37–38.
286. See, e.g., Coburn et al., supra note 19, at 7–8. Included is an “11-Point Checklist for
Identifying, Disclosing and Addressing Climate Risks and Opportunities.” Id. at 7. Among other
things, the checklist counsels that, in disclosure, “[s]pecific [emissions] numbers, when reasonably
attainable, are preferred over general statements.” Id. at 8.
287. See also Le Luo et al., Corporate Incentives to Disclose Carbon Information: Evidence
from Global 500 (Univ. of W. Sydney, Working Paper Series, Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1725106. In this paper, the authors examine
the factors that motivate large firms to provide climate change information to the Carbon
Disclosure Project and make that information public. The authors find that the tendency of firms
in the Global 500 to disclose carbon information increases when social, economic, and regulatory
pressures related to climate change are brought to bear on these firms. Id.
288. Deatherage, supra note 172, at 39; SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010).
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channels such as annual and sustainability reports and company
websites.”289
Accordingly, the SEC’s shareholder proposal rules are a favored tool of
such investors and climate change disclosure proponents.290 These rules
determine when a registrant “must include a shareholder’s proposal in its
proxy statement.”291 In recent years, record numbers of shareholder
proposals relating to climate change have been submitted for inclusion in
registrant proxy statements and voted on at registrant annual meetings.292
This trend has been prompted by not only by the increased awareness of
climate change issues generally, but the SEC’s growing unwillingness to
permit registrants to exclude these types of proposals by relying upon any
of the thirteen substantive bases for excluding a proposals, most notably
Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the so-called “ordinary business” exclusion.293
Under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), a shareholder proposal may be excluded from a
registrant’s proxy statement if the proposal “deals with a matter relating to
the company’s ordinary business operations.”294 Historically, the SEC has
not read Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as expansively as its plain language might
suggest, opting to carve out proposals “that focus on ‘sufficiently
significant social policy issues’” from its scope.295 Even so, registrants
could, for a time, rely upon the “ordinary business” exclusion to exclude
some climate change and environmental related proposals, particularly
proposals seeking corporate disclosure relating to internal assessments of
potential climate change risk or liabilities.296 In 2005, the SEC explained,

289. Julie Cotter & Muftah M. Najah, Institutional Investor Influence on Global Climate
Change Disclosure Practices 4–5, 6 (Australian Ctr. for Sustainable Bus. & Dev., Univ. of S.
Queensland, Working Paper Series, Feb. 12, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1760633.
290. See e.g., Elise N. Rindfleisch, Shareholder Proposals: A Catalyst for Climate ChangeRelated Disclosure, Analysis, and Action?, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 48 (2008) (“Whether or not
successfully adopted, these proposals enable shareholders to secure disclosure, deeper analysis,
and action from the corporations in the area of climate change.”).
291. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
292. See infra text accompanying note 311; Ted Allen et al., 2011 U.S. Postseason Report,
INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER
SERVICES,
INC.,
http://www.issgovernance.com/docs
/2011USPostseason [hereinafter 2011 U.S. Postseason Report].
293. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
294. Id.
295. SEC, Division of Corporate Finance: SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A (July 12, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm#P18_1860 (quoting SEC Release No. 34-40018
(May 21, 1998)).
296. See, e.g., SEC, Division of Corporate Finance: SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C (June 28,
2005), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14c.htm [hereinafter SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.
14C]. The SEC concurred that Xcel could exclude a proposal requesting that
the Board of Directors report . . . on (a) the economic risks associated with the
Company’s past, present, and future emissions of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide and mercury emissions, and the public stance of the company regarding
efforts to reduce these emissions and (b) the economic benefits of committing to a
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To the extent that a proposal and supporting statement focus on the
company engaging in an internal assessment of the risks or liabilities that
the company faces as a result of its operations that may adversely affect
the environment or the public’s health, we concur with the company’s
view that there is a basis for it to exclude the proposal under rule 14a8(i)(7) as relating to an evaluation of risk. To the extent that a proposal
and supporting statement focus on the company minimizing or eliminating
operations that may adversely affect the environment or the public’s
health, we do not concur with the company’s view that there is a basis for
297
it to exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(7).

In 2009, the SEC expressed concern that this analytical framework
“may have resulted in the unwarranted exclusion of proposals that relate to
the evaluation of risk but that focus on significant policy issues” and
changed course.298 Going forward, the SEC explained, “[t]he fact that a
proposal would require an evaluation of risk will not be dispositive of
whether the proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).”299 Rather,
the SEC will consider “whether the underlying subject matter of the risk
evaluation involves a matter of ordinary business to the company.”300
In those cases in which a proposal’s underlying subject matter transcends
the day-to-day business matters of the company and raises policy issues so
significant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote, the proposal
generally will not be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as long as a
sufficient nexus exists between the nature of the proposal and the
company. Conversely, in those cases in which a proposal’s underlying
subject matter involves an ordinary business matter to the company, the
proposal generally will be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). In
determining whether the subject matter raises significant policy issues and
has a sufficient nexus to the company, as described above, we will apply
the same standards that we apply to other types of proposals under Rule
14a-8(i)(7).301

Since the adoption of this “more appropriate framework,”302 registrants
have had a somewhat harder time excluding climate change related

substantial reduction of those emissions related to its current business activities (i.e.
potential improvement in competitiveness and profitability).
Id. (citation omitted).
297. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, supra note 296.
298. SEC, Division of Corporate Finance: SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14e.htm.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. (footnotes omitted).
302. Id.
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proposals by relying on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because the SEC has come to view
climate change as a “significant policy issue.”303
Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of
climate change related shareholder proposals. ISS, which tracks the
submission of and voting results for shareholder proposals annually,
reported that during the 2007 to 2011 proxy seasons, seventy climate
change related proposals were submitted to registrants in the S&P 500.304
Many of these proposals requested registrant disclosures and reports
regarding the impacts of climate change on the registrant’s business.305
During that same period, the number increased modestly to seventy-nine
such proposals for registrants in the Russell 3000.306 While these numbers
may not seem large—there are, after all, thousands of registrants in the
United States—they are telling when compared to data covering the 1997 to
2006 proxy seasons. According to ISS, during this much longer period, only
fourteen shareholder proposals were submitted to registrants in the S&P
500 and sixteen in the Russell 3000.307 Additionally, the average votes in
support of these proposals have also increased.308 Proposals submitted to the
S&P 500 registrants during the 2007 to 2011 proxy seasons averaged just

303. See, e.g., Letter from Gregory S. Belliston, Special Counsel, SEC, to Erron W. Smith,
Assistant Gen. Counsel, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Mar. 28, 2011) (attaching prior correspondence
with the SEC regarding this matter) (stating that the SEC was unable to concur that Wal-Mart
could exclude proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which requests that the board prepare a report
disclosing the business risks related to climate change); Letter from Gregory S. Belliston, Special
Counsel, SEC, to Gregory K. Palm, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2011) (attaching prior correspondence with the SEC regarding this matter)
(stating that the SEC was unable to concur that Goldman Sachs could exclude a proposal under
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) requesting that board prepare a global warming report); Letter from Gregory S.
Belliston, Special Counsel, SEC, to Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Counsel
for Gen. Electric Co. (Feb. 8, 2011) (attaching prior correspondence with the SEC regarding this
matter) (stating that the SEC was unable to concur that General Electric could exclude a proposal
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) requesting that the board prepare a report disclosing the business risk
related to developments in the scientific, political, legislative and regulatory landscape regarding
climate change); Letter from Heather L. Maples, Senior Special Counsel, SEC, to Connie S.
Stamets, Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, counsel for Chesapeake Energy Corp. (Apr. 13, 2010)
(attaching prior correspondence with the SEC regarding this matter) (stating that the SEC was
unable to concur that Chesapeake Energy could exclude proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)
requesting that board issue a sustainability report describing the company’s short- and long-term
responses to environmental, social, and governance-related issues, including greenhouse gas
emissions data and plans to manage emissions). Compare Letter from Gregory S. Belliston,
Special Counsel, SEC, to Sharon L. Burr, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dominion Resources Services,
Inc. (Feb. 22, 2011) (attaching prior correspondence with the SEC regarding this matter) (SEC
concurred that Dominion Resources could exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) requesting
that Dominion Resources offer Virginia electric power customers the option of directly purchasing
electricity generated from 100 percent renewable energy by 2012).
304. Hansen Analysis, supra note 238.
305. Id.; 2011 U.S. Postseason Report, supra note 292.
306. Hansen Analysis, supra note 238.
307. Id.
308. Id.; 2011 U.S. Postseason Report, supra note 292.
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over 19 percent, while proposals submitted to S&P 500 registrants during
the 1997 to 2006 proxy seasons averaged only 12 percent.309
These seemingly low support rates notwithstanding, research has shown
that shareholder resolutions can motivate registrants to reevaluate their
disclosure practices. A study conducted by Erin M. Reid and Michael W.
Toffel of Harvard Business School, published in 2009, explored the extent
to which shareholder activism and shareholder resolutions have prompted
registrants to participate in the Carbon Disclosure Project’s public
disclosure program.310 The authors tested two hypotheses: first, that “[a]
firm is more likely to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a
social movement if it has been targeted by a shareholder resolution on a
related social issue,” and second, that “[a] firm is more likely to engage in
practices consistent with the aims of a social movement when firms within
the same institutional field have been targeted by a shareholder resolution
on a related social issue.”311 To test these hypotheses, the authors focused

309. Hansen Analysis, supra note 238. For the 2011 proxy season, ISS has most recently
reported that
[t]he number of resolutions specifically focusing on climate change fell this year, from
37 to 30 filed. After many withdrawal agreements, 11 had come to votes by June 14,
down from 17 voted on the year before. Seven of those voted on by June 8 were part of
the now familiar campaign requesting companies to adopt quantifiable metrics for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Those votes averaged 20.1 percent support. Among
the other climate change proposals that came to votes were second-year resolutions
asking for reports from Chevron and ConocoPhillips on the financial risks of climate
change; those votes remained low, at under 8 percent. Overall, climate change-related
proposals averaged 16.2 percent support—as compared with 21.1 percent in all of 2010.
In addition to the 11 proposals voted on from climate change activists, shareholders
considered four from conservative groups that are skeptical about the severity of the
issue. These resolutions averaged only 3.7 percent approval; the best showing was 6.5
percent support for a resolution on climate-related lobbying at Duke Power. Among
other environmental issues, support for resolutions asking companies to report on oil
sands development remained strong at ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil, averaging 27.5
percent.
Ted Allen, Institutional Shareholder Services, GOVERNANCE WKLY. (June 16, 2011).
310. Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate
Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-019, 2009),
available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-019.pdf. As the authors explain,
Each year, CDP [Carbon Disclosure Project] asks the top executive managers of the
world’s largest public companies to disclose information about the risks and
opportunities posed by climate change, the strategies being pursued to address them,
and company-wide greenhouse gas emissions. In 2006 and 2007, 44% of S&P 500
Index companies responded to this request by publicly disclosing at least some portion
of the requested information. By participating in CDP’s process, these firms were not
only providing information to CDP and the investors it represented, but were also
engaging in new and extensive disclosure practices neither common nor required in the
United States.
Id. at 4.
311. Id. at 9–10.
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on all registrants listed in the S&P 500 Index during the sample period of
2006 to 2007.312
The findings of this study illustrate the power of shareholder
resolutions, even those that do not achieve majority support, to influence
the disclosure practices (at least voluntary disclosure practices) of target and
non-target registrants. Specifically, the authors found that registrants “that
have been targeted, and [registrants] in industries in which other
[registrants] have been targeted, by shareholder actions on environmental
issues are more likely to publicly disclose information to the [Carbon
Disclosure Project].”313 In fact, “[b]eing targeted with a shareholder
resolution more than doubled the odds that a firm would publicly report.”314
The results also indicated that “shareholder resolutions have spillover
effects on other [registrants] in a targeted industry,” prompting participation
in the Carbon Disclosure Project by non-targeted registrants.315 Although
the Reid and Toffel study did not examine the link between shareholder
activism and resolutions and registrant disclosures in SEC filings, their
study provides compelling support for the proposition that continued
shareholder activism in this regard may ultimately lead to increased
disclosure in registrant SEC filings.
Fifth, private shareholder and non-shareholder lawsuits aimed at
registrant activity affecting climate change will likely prompt increased
disclosure in SEC filings, specifically for registrants directly involved in
such litigation (e.g., pursuant to Item 103 of Regulation S-K) and, more
generally, for registrants vulnerable to such lawsuits (e.g., pursuant to Item
503 of Regulation S-K). These kinds of lawsuits have proliferated in recent
years and have received widespread attention, though many have
encountered stiff headwinds thus far.316 Many of these are grounded in
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s common law nuisance claims against a number of large energy
companies alleging defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global warming and
forced plaintiffs to relocate their village). The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that
they presented a non-justiciable political question and that plaintiffs failed to assert an injury
sufficient to maintain Article III standing or, more specifically, that plaintiff’s theory of causation
was too tenuous to the alleged injury to be traceable to defendants’ conduct. See id.; Cal. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (involving claims by
the state that automaker’s products were significant contributors to greenhouse gas emissions and
seeking damages for harms of climate change). The Court dismissed, holding that suit presented
non-justiciable political question and that the state agreed to voluntarily dismiss the suit. See
Order Granting Voluntary Dismissal, No. 07-16908 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (dismissing case and holding that appeals court lacked
jurisdiction, leaving district court’s dismissal as controlling opinion). Plaintiffs, as a putative class
action, sought to hold defendants partially liable for damages in connection with Hurricane
Katrina claiming that defendant’s greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global warming and, in
turn, the power of Hurricane Katrina and the levels of harm suffered. Id.
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nuisance theory and success is usually bound up in questions of
justiciability, causation, and damages—major obstacles for claimants so
far.317 Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal court’s
authority to enjoin emissions of greenhouse gases from coal-fired plants on
the basis of federal common law causes of action is displaced by the Clean
Air Act.318 Nevertheless, the Court remanded to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals to determine the issue of whether the Act also preempts state
common law nuisance actions.319 So, at least in theory, such suits may yet
have life, albeit much more limited.320 Thus, here, as in the case of
securities fraud litigation discussed above, for many registrants it may not
be the prospect of liability so much as it is the prospect of merely having to
defend against a claim of liability that enters the calculus of disclosure. Tort
317. See text accompanying note 278; see also Francis J. Menton, Issues of Proof in Climate
Change Litigation, 242 N.Y.L.J. 124 (Dec. 29, 2009); Wallace, supra note 279, at 305.
318. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (considering claims by
plaintiffs, including six states, one city, and three nonprofit land trusts, against four private energy
companies and one federally owned energy company, that defendants’ emissions constituted a
public nuisance under federal and state common law; plaintiffs asked the court to impose caps on
carbon emissions at these companies). The federal district court dismissed the suit, holding that
“determining causation and redressibility in the context of alleged global warming would require
[the court] to make judgments that could have an impact on the other branches’ responses to what
is plainly a political question.” Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting defendant’s
jurisdictional challenges and arguments that greenhouse gas emissions claims were not covered by
federal common law of nuisance. See Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
319. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
320. See, e.g., Supreme Court Fails to Shut Door on Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Litigation,
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (Jun. 21, 2011), http://www.akingump.com/communi
cationcenter/newsalertdetail.aspx?pub=2778 (“The AEP decision does not mention anywhere the
potential for common-law damage actions based on any connection between GHG emissions and
climate change. But, in describing the regulatory and enforcement tools available under the Clean
Air Act to address GHG emissions, the Court focused on statutory provisions to establish or revise
emissions limits, i.e., the relief sought by the AEP plaintiffs. The Court concluded that ‘[t]he Act
itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power
plants—the same relief plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law.’ By contrast, there are no
parallel provisions on the Clean Air Act authorizing the award of damages for injury to persons or
property. In terms of the doctrine of displacement, however, the Court characterized the issue as
‘whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.’
Future plaintiffs are likely to focus on the distinction between the tests for displacement versus
preemption and the lack of any language in AEP discussing claims for damages.” (footnotes
omitted)); Edward Clark Lewis et al., U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Common Law Causes of Action
for Climate Change Litigation, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (June 23, 2011),
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=4982&site_id=494
&detail=yes (“Aside from jurisdictional matters, the Supreme Court’s opinion regarding
displacement of federal common law causes of action for tort-based climate change suits will have
a severe impact on the ability of plaintiffs to challenge a source’s air emissions outside of the
regulatory scheme. Indeed, several components of the Court’s rationale in AEP would appear to
hold true with regard to displacement of state common law causes of action as well. It warrants
following whether the Second Circuit will look to such dicta in considering the merits and
availability of the state common law claims. Whether in regards to pending and future tort-based
challenges to climate change, or litigation over the satisfaction of regulatory actions, it is clear that
this is not the last time a court will opine on these issues.”).
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litigation, as these climate change cases have been styled, can be
exceedingly expensive and resource intensive.
Finally, the SEC ultimately will refocus on climate change disclosure,
which will likely prompt maturation and increase in climate change
disclosure. At the risk of being seen as having abandoned the field after
highlighting the issue, the SEC will likely return its focus to this issue as the
financial crisis subsides and climate and energy policy again take center
stage. The SEC’s comment letter process is an important influence in the
development of registrant disclosure. Registrants tend to watch this process
closely, whether or not they or their peers are targets of the process.
Additionally, new or enhanced disclosures by one registrant in a particular
sector tend to influence the disclosures of other registrants in the same
sector.
This unfolding maturation and increase in climate change disclosure
would not necessarily be a new development. Rather, it would continue a
trend already underway, as evidenced by at least some of the disclosure
reviews discussed previously in this Article. Recall that, as discussed
earlier, the 2006 Friends of the Earth study of 112 registrants in the
automobile and energy industries found modest improvements in climate
change disclosure since the benchmark year of 2000, specifically, an overall
climate change disclosure rate of 49 percent compared with 26 percent.321
Davis Polk’s review of trends in post-Interpretive Release disclosure found:


An increase in generic weather risk factors;



New disclosure on potential changes in demand for products and
services and on increases in fuel prices; [and]
....



A minimal increase in climate change disclosure in the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of these
SEC filings, . . .322

This finding comports with my own review of select registrant filings
discussed above. These trends show that perhaps slowly, but surely, climate
change disclosure is increasing and we can expect to see it increase in the
future, to the extent that individual issuers determine climate change may
have a material impact on their business.
CONCLUSION
Although the Interpretive Release may have been, and continues to be,
controversial, it has put a premium on a registrant’s familiarity with the
concept of climate change and its possible effects on a registrant’s
321. See MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 152.
322. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS—2011 UPDATE, supra note 228, at 2.
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operations and businesses. Also, there is no doubt that the Interpretive
Release has prompted registrants to watch legislative and regulatory
developments more closely and, in addition, has prompted savvy registrants
to review their disclosure controls, procedures, and processes for assessing
the materiality of climate change matters on their own operations. In these
respects, the Interpretive Release has achieved some of its goals. These
forces, together with the reasons discussed in Part VII of this Article,
portend a maturation and increase in climate change disclosure in the years
to come.

